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ABSTRACT
The dissertation comprises four chapters focusing on issues concerning policy re-
forms and monetary policy in Zambia. Chapter 1 briefly outlines the theoretical
foundations for the reforms undertaken in Zambia since the mid 1980s and the
process thereof. The main issues addressed were the removal of interest rate and
credit controls, exchange rate devaluation and the use of indirect instruments
in implementing monetary policy. Monetary policy also began to focus more on
stabilisation through bringing the inflation rate down. The review indicates that
although the control of inflation is still difficult and figures are still in double
digit levels, annual inflation rates have reduced significantly compared to levels
achieved in the early 1990s. The nominal exchange rate has been depreciating
prompting increased intervention from the central bank. Despite the increase
in nominal interest rates, real deposit rates have remained negative.
Chapter two analyses the monetary transmission mechanism in Zambia. Vec-
tor auto -regressions are estimated for the pre-reform and post-reform periods.
Variance decompositions and impulse response functions are examined to see
whether there are any changes observed in the monetary transmission mecha-
nism after the reforms. Different systems are estimated in each period using
alternate variables as measures of monetary policy shocks. The results show
that contractionary monetary policy is followed by a fall in both output and
prices. When compared, results from the two estimation periods show that
both the responsiveness of prices and output to policy shocks and the magni-
tude of their forecast error variance decompositions explained by these variables
have increased since the reforms. The results also show that the impact lags
have reduced. There is evidence of the bank lending channel both before and
after the reforms. Of the mechanisms estimated, the exchange rate mechanism
seems to be the most important mechanism for transmission of policy shocks to
both prices and output during the post-reform period.
Chapter three investigates whether monetary aggregates have useful infor-
mation for predicting inflation other than that provided by inflation itself. Fore-
casting experiments are conducted to see whether monetary aggregates and se-
lected financial sector variables are useful in predicting inflation.We perform
forecasting experiments and compare the performance of different models. We
also estimate an error correction model of inflation. Of the monetary aggregates
considered, M2 contains the most information and its growth rate significant in
the inflation model. The external sector variables are also important. The
results indicate that inflation exhibits a high level of inertia suggesting the pres-
ence of implicit indexation and significant inflationary expectations possibly
due to past fiscal effects and low policy credibility. Overall, the foreign sector
variables seem to be more important for movements in prices than monetary
aggregates even in the long run.
The importance of the exchange rate to stabilisation policy in Zambia is
underscored by the results obtained in chapters 2 and 3. In this paper, we
pursue this idea by investigating the effect of central bank intervention on ex-
change rates in Zambia. Using a GARCH (1, 1) model of the exchange rate,
we simultaneously estimate the effect of cumulative intervention on the mean
and variance of the exchange rate.We find that central bank intervention in the
foreign exchange market increases the mean but reduces the variance of the
exchange rate. The explanation leans towards speculative bandwagons and a
’leaning against the wind’ strategy. Although there is no attempt to distinguish
through which channel intervention operates, we argue that this is more likely to
be a signalling effect rather than a portfolio balance effect. This effect operates
mainly through the supply and demand of foreign exchange in the market.
x
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PREFACE
The importance of the financial sector in economic development for developing
countries has attracted a lot of attention in recent years. The perverse effects of
interest rate controls, overvalued exchange rates, controlled lending and other
controls have led to a large volume of research relating to financial reform. An
open and well regulated financial sector promotes economic growth and stability.
In the current setting with a rapidly globalising world economy, efficient financial
sectors are essential for productive gains from the world market and to protect
the domestic economy against foreign shocks. For most developing countries
this became very evident during the oil crises of the 1970s.
With this in mind, issues of financial reform have featured very prominently
both in the discussion and implementation of economic reforms in Africa. Al-
though a liberalised system is generally more robust than a repressed one, there
are complexities of the sequencing of reforms, equity, efficiency, institutional
support for reforms, and general governance which present practical huddles in
the new environment within which developing economies must operate. These
issues raise questions of how the reformed economies are performing in the new
environment and whether the reforms have actually achieved the intended goals.
However, there is little direct evidence on how the reform programs have per-
formed in these countries, especially in the financial sector.
The essays in this thesis address three related issues linking different aspects
of financial sector and monetary policy reform. The changes that have occurred
in the transmission of policy to the macro-economy are addressed first. This is
followed by a paper that evaluates the information content of different variables
for forecasting and predicting inflation. The last paper draws on conclusions in
both the first and second papers that highlight the importance of the exchange
rate for monetary policy in Zambia and looks at the impact of central bank
intervention in the foreign exchange market.
The understanding of the potency of monetary policy and the transmission
mechanism as addressed in the first paper is very important to the success
of monetary policy. Efficient implementation requires policy makers to under-
stand the path policy takes to impact the macro-economy and the time horizon
needed for impact. Key policy issues in the current policy framework arise. For
example, do changes in reserve money actually lead to changes in M2 and/ or
inflation? If yes, how long do these changes take to impact inflation? This
information would then aid policy makers to know which instruments are more
useful and which time horizon should be used to target inflation. We estimate
Vector Auto Regressions (VARs) and use the results to evaluate the importance
of different policy variables for developments in prices and output. We look
at the total amount of variations in prices and output due to different policy
variables, the direction of responses and the length of the impact lags. Such
information is useful in answering questions such as those cited above. We find
that the potency of monetary policy has increased since the reforms especially
for price pass-through.
Conducting monetary policy is a difficult process because monetary policy
affects the economy with a lag. Achieving goals requires some ability to peer
into the future. Consequently, decision makers must make forecasts to help
in decision making. To conduct these forecasts, most central banks take a
number of variables into account. The exclusive focus on one or a few selected
variables as is done in the financial programming framework implies that the
policy makers believe these variables must contain enough information about
movements in the target variables. Paper II is an attempt to evaluate the
information content of not only the monetary aggregates used by the Bank of
Zambia (BOZ) to target inflation, but other key variables such as interest rates,
the domestic debt and the exchange rate which have the potential of being very
useful inflation indicators. Exchange rates and the deposit rate turn out to be
xiv
the most useful indicators in the set of variables considered.
Once interest rate controls are removed and the exchange rate floated, the
interest rate and the exchange rate become important components in the trans-
mission mechanism. The more open the economy, the greater the importance
of the exchange rate in the policy process and the more important this variable
becomes as an optional policy conduit. A depreciation of the exchange rate
increases inflation and vice versa. For this reason, the stability of the exchange
rate is very important for price stabilisation. To ensure this, most central banks
intervene in foreign exchange markets to smooth out short run fluctuations of
the exchange rate. However, the effects of central bank intervention in the
foreign exchange market are not straight forward. The efficiency of the foreign
exchange market and the nature and credibility of the interventions matter. The
effect of such interventions therefore is an empirical question. Paper III pro-
vides an empirical estimation of the effect of BOZ interventions in the foreign
exchange market. The results indicate that intervention reduces fluctuations in
the exchange rate.
The results from the empirical papers in this thesis lead to the following
conclusions.
1. The potency of monetary policy in Zambia has increased since the
reforms
2. The deposit rate seems to be a better indicator of the central bank policy
stance than the base rate ( 3-month treasury bill rate). The importance
of the deposit rate suggests a good policy option to monetary targeting
3. M2 is important in understanding price movements in Zambia.
4. The exchange rate seems to be even more useful. This underscores the
importance of a stable exchange rate. However, foreign exchange
intervention does not seem to provide the complete solution. Possible
options or complements include exchange rate targeting and a dirty float.
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1. FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORMS AND MONETARY
POLICY IN ZAMBIA
ABSTRACT
In this chapter, we briefly outline the theoretical foundations for the reforms
undertaken in Zambia since the mid 1980s and the process thereof. The main issues
addressed were the removal of interest rate and credit controls, exchange rate
devaluation and the use of indirect instruments in implementing monetary policy.
Monetary policy also began to focus more on stabilisation through bringing the
inflation rate down. The review indicates that although the control of inflation is still
difficult and figures are still in double digit levels, annual inflation rates have reduced
significantly compared to levels achieved in the early 1990s. The nominal exchange
rate has been depreciating prompting increased intervention from the central bank.
Despite the increase in nominal interest rates, real deposit rates have remained
negative.
Keywords:Monetary Policy, Financial Sector Reforms, Zambia
1.1 Introduction
For over two decades, the Zambian economy was dominated by government
ownership. The financial sector was riddled with controls implemented
through direct control over credit and interest rates. There were also
substantial administrative controls in place directing lending and controlling
both local and international financial transactions. The exchange rate was
fixed and trade was heavily regulated. A programme of overall economic
reform was fully embarked upon in 1991 and financial reforms were amongst
the key issues addressed.
Many financial reforms have been put in place and economic management now
revolves quite a lot around monetary policy. The interest in this chapter is to
briefly review the theoretical foundations for financial reforms and more
specifically, issues arising out of that for monetary policy. We start by
outlining the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis and its extensions and then go on to
discuss theoretical implications for monetary reforms. We then move on to
discuss the evolution of the monetary sector in Zambia
1.2 Theoretical Foundations For Financial Reforms
1.2.1 Financial Reforms
The theory on financial reforms as is emphasizes today in developing countries
goes back to McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). Although their assumptions
about the nature on money in the models differ, both theories have similar
implications for financial reforms. The foundation of their analyses is that
interest rates have a positive relationship with economic growth and that low
interest rates would therefore impede growth. This was a challenge to earlier
existing belief that directing lending to critical sectors and keeping interest
rates low would stimulate investment .1
1 This was based on the argument that money and capital are substitutes in the portfolio
of private wealth and market failure. see Solow (1956) and Tobin and Brianard (1963)
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McKinnon (1973)makes two basic assumptions. First that all economic units
are self-financed and secondly that investments have indivisibilities of
considerable importance. The implications of these assumptions are that an
investor must accumulate money balances before he or she is able to invest.
This accumulation is encouraged if there is a positive real deposit interest rate.
A positive real interest rate lowers the opportunity cost of accumulating
balances and encourages individuals to deposit their money in the banks. This
allows accumulation of loanable funds from which investors can borrow. The
indivisibilities of investment imply that the demand for money is larger the
larger the share of investment in total expenditures. In this theory then,
money and capital are complementary. It is often referred to as the
complementarity hypothesis. Without implying direction of causality, one can
say increased intermediation in this model leads to increased investment.
The theory can be formalized as a money demand function i.e.
M
P
= f(Y,
I
Y
, d− pie) (1.1)
Where Y is real GNP, I is gross investment, d, the nominal interest rate, pie,
expected inflation (so that d− pie is the real rate of interest), M is the stock of
broad money and P is the price level.
In the model, money has a first order impact on decisions to save and invest
which are taken to be one decision (because of the need to accumulate for
investment). The model can also be expressed as an investment function
I
Y
= f(γ, d− pie) (1.2)
where γ is the average return to capital.
In Shaw’s model, money is backed by productive investment loans to the
private sector. When the money stock is large relative to the level of economic
activity (say M2GDP ), the level of intermediation between savers and investors is
also larger. Thus this theory explicitly emphasises the importance of financial
intermediation. When a repressed economy reforms its financial sector and
removes controls, higher real rates of deposit increase intermediation leading
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to financial development by providing incentives to savers. It also leads to a
higher average efficiency of investment by lowering the cost of borrowing
through providing risk diversification, accommodating liquidity preference,
lowering informational costs and increasing operational efficiency. Shaw’s
model is an inside money model and is often referred to as the Debt
Intermediation View(DIV). The money demand equation in the model can be
written as follows:
M
P
= f(Y, γ, d− pie)
where γ is a vector of opportunity costs in real terms of holding money.
This theory relies on neo-classical market clearing assumptions. Specifically,
the market must work to equilibrate the demand and supply of loanable funds
and the market must be competitive. In this view then, when interest rates
are kept artificially low, there will be low incentives for saving hence little
funds to lend, limiting investment and therefore the growth of the economy. In
this case, intermediation is repressed. The removal of controls in a financially
repressed economy therefore implies that the interest rates will increase
resulting in higher savings. These higher savings mean the availability of more
investment capital and hence an increase in output. The McKinnon-Shaw
hypothesis is therefore the basic foundation for financial liberalization.
However it does not explain the workings of banking systems in many
developing countries and how liberalization can address questions of
fragmentation, bank distress and financial rationing Sikorski (1996).
A number of models have been developed to try and refine the basic
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis. One of the classical refinements is the
introduction of the model of imperfect information by Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981). The model demonstrates that an equilibrium financial market can be
characterized by credit rationing. This arises because after long periods of
repression and financial underdevelopment, banks are often not in a position
to completely assess the risk characteristics of their potential borrowers. This
is compounded by information asymmetries arising from either bad accounting
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practices or lack of monitoring systems. Where such information asymmetries
are significant, banks push up their lending rates so as to compensate for risk
associated with lending. Two problems often result from this. Firstly, adverse
selection problems arise because with high interest rates, the pool of borrowers
is increasingly composed of high risk borrowers. Such borrowers are more
likely to make risky investments which if successful would have high returns.
The second is the moral hazard problem where higher interest rates induce
firms to make more risky investments which have higher expected returns.
The result is that some borrowers are completely rationed out of the credit
market even if they have viable projects .
In addition to adverse selection and moral hazard problems, financial
liberalization tends to initially increase interest rates. This results in the
deterioration of banks’ loan portfolios. The source of this problem is twofold.
Firstly, when there has been a history of failed attempts at liberalisation as
was the case in Zambia, the private sector may not have confidence in the
reforms. Firms will not adjust their balance sheets or loan portfolios to
accommodate the shocks resulting from the removal of controls. When the
controls are actually removed, these firms experience severe financial problems
and in many cases may not be able to repay their loans. As a result, banks
have to increase their interest rates to compensate for lending and market risk
thereby worsening the already bad loan portfolios. In many cases, these loans
cannot be written off and firms begin to borrow to finance existing loans.
Because the solvency of the banks to a large extent depends on the survival of
these firms, the banks continue lending to these firms creating a large pool of
non-performing loans. Secondly, even if the banks cannot raise interest rates
on existing loans, increased deposit rates imply a negative spread on existing
loans as banks cannot increase the lending rate on these loans. This
compounds bank fragility.
Another issue that has been raised concerns the presence of informal markets.
In most of these countries, informal markets have arisen not only because of
the repression from controls but also the high cost of small and frequent
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transactions. The larger part of the population in these countries have low
incomes and they often conduct small and frequent transactions. This entails
a significant level of transactions costs for formal institutions. A pool of
potential borrowers with no access to credit develops. The result is an
informal financial market operating parallel to the formal with low
transactions costs and often low information asymmetry as they operate
within their own communities.
The effect of interest rate liberalisation in terms of total loan supply also
depends on the flow of funds between the formal and informal sectors (Taylor
(1983),Wijnbergen (1983)). If the links between the two sectors are strong so
that loans in the informal market are a close substitute for formal market
deposits, an increase in real interest rates in the formal sector would shift the
flow of funds towards itself. If the small scale businesses that rely on the
informal sector for finance are a substantial part of economic activity, this
might lead to a fall in output contrary to the predictions of the
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis. On the other hand if the increase in deposits in
the formal sector substantially increases not only loan supply but also
accessibility for such small scale businesses, the increased bank intermediation
may lead to increased output as expected.
Although Shaw’s DIV hypothesis implicitly addresses the issue of working
markets before interest rate liberalisation, the issue of overall macro-economic
stability is absent. By the time most developing countries are reforming their
economies and considering or actually implementing financial reforms, these
economies are usually in distress wrought by both internal and external
deficits. Attaining an acceptable level of macro economic stability is a needed
pre-requisite to avoid further destabilising the financial sector and jeopardising
other reforms (Cavallo and Cottani (1993)).
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1.2.2 Monetary Reforms
Many countries faced with repressed financial systems face problems of
monetary control associated with ineffectiveness of direct credit and interest
rate controls. These controls are associated with inefficiency in resource
allocation. Under such a regime, monetary aggregates cease to bear a close
relationship to the goals of monetary policy. Monetary reforms are central to
most financial reforms. The focus is on moving to more indirect means of
monetary control and therefore freeing controls on both credit and interest
rates. Indirect instruments that can be used in the early stages of reform while
markets are not yet fully developed include market operations such as auctions
of government treasury bills or central bank refinance credits or certificates of
deposits to control money market liquidity 2.
More indirect market based approaches enhance monetary control and increase
the likelihood of achieving macroeconomic stability. Increasing reliance on
indirect monetary controls allows the authorities to eliminate distortions in the
financial markets resulting not only from controls of interest rates and credit,
but also from the use of high non-interest bearing reserve requirements to
control liquidity. Indirect monetary control also enhances the development of
money and inter-bank markets which eventually also improve the potency of
monetary policy. It is desirable therefore to introduce the use of such
instruments early in the reform process.
The elimination of interest rate and credit controls has potentially important
effects on monetary aggregates. The liberalisation of interest rates and credit
could lead to a shift in money demand affecting both the quantity demanded
and the interest rate elasticity of their demand. On the one hand since credit
was constrained by direct controls before the reforms, there is a tendency for
banks to run down their excess reserves by increasing lending in an
2 The type of instruments adopted must take into account the legal and technical arrange-
ments to distribute central bank profits and/or losses if these should occur in the use of central
bank rather than treasury paper. See Johnston and Brekk (1999) for a survey of monetary
instrument reforms in nine developing countries
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environment already wrought with excess demand for credit.
On the other hand, liberalisation of interest rates may lead to initial increases
in deposit rates relative to other rates. This would lead to increases in
deposits and broad money holdings. In that case, broad money will become
less sensitive to changes in the general level of interest rates. As a result of
these structural shifts, the information content of aggregates would become
difficult to assess during the transition stage. It also becomes difficult to
control the aggregates using interest rates, so a wider range of financial
indicators is required during this phase.
Comparatively, the increases in credit are likely to be higher than increases in
deposits since deposits were not directly constrained before reforms but were
rather just responding to changes in the deposit rate. Following this
adjustment period, credit growth slows down while deposits continue to grow
if positive real interest rates are maintained. Credit and deposits eventually
converge allowing for balanced growth with a higher level of overall resource
mobilisation. 3 If positive interest rates are not maintained, credit expansion
could result in a loss of macroeconomic control and increasing inflation or
worsening the balance of payments. Trying to control credit expansion by the
use of interest rates or indirect monetary controls could result in large
increases in interest rates. Where the capital account is open, this could lead
to massive capital inflows and a subsequent appreciation of the exchange rate
which in turn could have adverse effect for the real sector.
There is also a close link between the design of monetary policy instruments
and operations and the structure and depth of money markets, including the
supporting payments systems. As a result, reforms of monetary control
procedures are best accompanied by parallel measures to strengthen money
and inter-bank markets and payments systems.
The opening up of the capital account also has implications for monetary
policy. Because direct methods of monetary control become very ineffective
once the capital account is opened, the move to indirect monetary control
3 See Bisat et al. (1999) for a more detailed discussion
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becomes an inevitable pre-requisite. With increased capital mobility, the
demand for domestically defined monetary aggregates may become more
sensitive to international interest rate differentials making it more difficult to
identify a stable domestic monetary aggregate. Opening up the capital account
therefore reinforces the adoption of a more eclectic monetary framework and a
move towards giving more weight to exchange rates in monetary assessments.
Bank regulation is another important aspect of monetary reforms. Before
most of the physical aspects of financial reform such as those discussed above
are put in place, there is a need to put a basic financial structure such as
auditing, accounting, legal systems, and basic regulation in place (Caprio
(1997)). The main goal of prudential regulation is to lower the risks and costs
associated with institutional failure while achieving the increased efficiency of
the financial system. This implies that while the government should leave the
economy to the market, it should enhance its role to ensure fair and honest
markets through prudential regulations without using it to perpetuate the
controls existing before the reforms. When reforms are implemented without
first putting appropriate regulation in place in an economy where the banking
system is under-capitalised or insolvent, bank distress can result as has been
seen in many African countries. The resulting distress can in turn complicate
monetary management and limit the effectiveness of stabilisation policies.
The presence of information asymmetries magnifies the need for appropriate
regulation early in the reforms. When information asymmetries are prevalent
as is the case in most developing countries, problems of adverse selection lead
to the setting of imprudently high interest rates. Banks end up attracting very
risky borrowers resulting in high levels of non-performing loans. Putting
appropriate regulation in place allows the markets to provide correct signals
while helping to ensure that this takes place at acceptable costs and in an
orderly manner. When liberalisation precedes prudential regulation,
weaknesses in the market can lead to financial fragility, bank failures and an
undermining of monetary policy.
10
Monetary Reforms in Zambia
Central banking in Zambia started with the Opening of the Bank of Rhodesia
(Now Zambia and Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (now Malawi) in 1961. When
the federation disintegrated with the independence of Malawi, the new bank
split and the Rhodesian one was named the Bank of Rhodesia in 1964 and
finally renamed to Bank of Zambia later the same year when Zambia attained
independence.
The organizational structure of the Bank of Zambia was for a long time the
one inherited from the colonial period. The responsibility of policy and
administration lay in a board of directors. The president appointed the Bank
governor (who also acted as the board director) and the deputy Board
director. The minister and permanent secretary of the ministry of finance
appointed the rest of the board members. These appointments tended to
create a very strong relationship between the central bank and the
government. This relationship was made stronger by a provision in the Bank
Of Zambia Act (1965) that the bank had to oblige if the minister of finance
under consultation with the governor gave instructions to it. Despite other
provisions in the Act, this tended to compromise the central bank’s autonomy.
In addition to traditional central Bank duties, the Bank of Zambia Act (1965)
provided that the central bank also had a developmental role. It was argued
that since the financial system was highly underdeveloped, the central bank
should help in establishing appropriate institutions. This led to BOZ
participating in the establishment of the Zambia National Commercial Bank
(ZNCB), the Zambia Stock exchange and buying of shares in the Development
Bank of Zambia (DBZ).
The rest of the financial system was composed of five foreign banks and a few
insurance companies. After independence, the government opened up a
government owned bank, ZNCB, created development related finance
companies and nationalized insurance and pensions industries. A post office
savings bank (later called The National Savings and Credit Bank) was opened
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to serve savers in the lower income brackets.
The ultimate goal of monetary policy was economic growth. The
developmental role of the central bank seemed to dominate policy. The
existing commercial banks at the time made very few loans to indigenous
businessmen and the agricultural sector. As a result, the government put in
place a lot of administrative controls to try and redistribute lending so that
these sectors are covered. These included directed lending, limits on
composition of boards of directors and control on interest rates. Commercial
banks were also required by law to open branches in rural areas.
Between 1964 and 1974, the output and prices of copper were good. Because
of this, exports were generally greater than imports and there were no major
problems with the external balance. The official currency in Zambia between
1964 and 1968 was the Zambian pound which was pegged to the British pound
and fully convertible. In 1968, the currency was changed to the kwacha and
de-linked from the pound and linked to the US dollar and later to the SDR in
1976. At the time, interest rates were controlled by BOZ.
After 1974, a number of factors led to balance of payments problems. Firstly,
there was the oil shock of 1973/74 and the resulting recession. This reduced
the demand for copper and led to reductions in export revenue. The reliance
of the manufacturing industry on imported raw materials and spare parts also
led to reduced capacity utilisation and a fall in real GDP. The result was a
shortage of foreign exchange and a negative current account.
Internally, the government budget began to be negative in the early 1970s
mainly due to continuously increasing public consumption. Many
socio-economic services such as education and health care were provided free
for everyone. During this period, the budget was mainly financed by the
copper revenues. As the copper revenues started to fall, the government
maintained its consumption patterns in the hope that this was a temporal
situation and resorted to borrowing both internally and externally.
During this period, both lending and deposit rates were kept low for a number
of reasons. One main reason was to induce economic growth. This view was
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inspired mainly by Keynesian economics that suggested that low interest rates
availed cheap investment funds leading to an increase in output 4. Low
interest rates were also justified on the basis that it helped keep government
and parastatal debt service costs within manageable limits. Figure 1.1 shows
interest rates and inflation between 1970 and 1982. Defining the implicit real
interest rates as the difference between the nominal rate and the inflation rate,
we can see that interest rates were negative for almost the whole period.
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Fig. 1.1: Inflation and Interest Rates 1970-1983
As both the balance of payments and fiscal deficit worsened, the government
increased its borrowing. The copper prices did not pick up and neither did
demand. The deficit financing that BOZ provided the government fuelled
inflation that had began to get serious during the oil crisis of 1973/74.
Because the economy was largely controlled, there were no in-built
mechanisms in the system to adjust to both the internal and external
4 We note here that the theory in mention implies the real interest rate but this was not
taken into account
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pressures. The government responded to external pressure by imposing a lot of
controls on trade and further borrowing. Tariffs were increased, quotas were
imposed and foreign exchange in the official channels was directed to priority
sectors. Internally, the government continued to bridge fiscal deficits by deficit
financing and loans from the international community.
By the early 1980s, it was clear that the Zambian economy was under severe
pressure. Because of the inability to fully service loans, the IMF and World
Bank began to attach conditionalities to the loans given to Zambia. In 1983,
Zambia received the first conditional loan from the IMF. This was the birth of
the structural adjustment programs in Zambia. The main feature of these
reforms was to allow a greater role for market forces in the economy.
Specifically, the kwacha was to be devalued, interest rates decontrolled,
international trade liberalised, public expenditure reduced, prices decontrolled,
and debt servicing improved.
In response, the institutionally set interest rates were increased. Between
January 1983 and January 1987 when the reforms were briefly abandoned, the
lending rate increased by 154 percentage points while the treasury bill rate
increased by about 195 percentage points from 9.5 % to 28%. In 1983, a
basket of the currencies of Zambia’s five major trading partners was
introduced. The kwacha was now adjusted within a narrow range and set to
depreciate at 1% per month and this percentage was increased to 2.5% by
1984. This was meant to let the kwacha settle to a realistic market value. The
foreign exchange auction was introduced in October 1985 with the official
exchange rate at 2.2 kwacha per dollar and by the beginning of 1987, the
exchange rate had increased to 15 kwacha per dollar.
The ensuing devaluation and price decontrols led to marked increases in
inflation. Between 1983 and 1987, the CPI inflation more than doubled from
19.6% to 43%. During the same period, there was significant growth in
monetary aggregates, which also contributed to increases in inflation. In 1987,
as the economy wide reforms progressed, maize subsidies were also removed5.
5 Maize is the staple food in Zambia and had thus far been heavily subsidised by the
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There was heavy rioting on the Copperbelt and the government decided to
abandon the IMF/World bank sponsored adjustment programmes in May 1987
6. The government embarked on a new development program-the New
Economic Recovery Programme (NERP). One of the major issues was to
influence consumption patterns to change in favour of local products. There
was emphasis on internally generated resources to finance growth and
development rather than relying on aid. Imports were controlled and key
products were rationed. Consumption of locally produced goods and services
was encouraged.
When the reform program was abandoned, the foreign exchange auction was
replaced by a foreign exchange allocation system under a Foreign Exchange
Management Committee (FEMAC) and the exchange rate was re-valued from
K21/$ to K8/$. In February 1987, the interest rates were also revised
downwards. Aid stopped flowing from the IMF and the World Bank and the
plan was to rationalise the use of foreign exchange so that it could compensate
for this loss of funds through net export earnings. Repayment of the existing
debt was limited to 10 % of net export earnings.
During the NERP period, there was improved economic growth. Net exports
were positive mainly due to a significant fall in imports. Price controls were
reintroduced and in addition price monitoring was put in place. The exchange
rate was re-valued and fixed again. This together with the re-introduction of
controls on trade led to chronic shortages of consumer goods. These shortages
fuelled prices. Government budget deficits continued and were continuously
funded through printing of money leading to increases in money supply and
hence increased inflation. The resulting decline in foreign aid put a lot of
pressure on government expenditure and in 1989 Zambia returned to the
IMF/World Bank sponsored programs in 1989 and the foreign exchange
government. When price controls were removed on other food crops such as cassava and
sorghum, maize subsidies were maintained with the view to remove these subsidies gradually
6 The Copperbelt is one of the largest and most urbanised provinces in Zambia. It holds
almost all of Zambia’s copper mines
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auction was re-introduced.
A new program under the title New Economic Program was put in place in
1989. The features of this program were basically the same as those under
NERP except that they were implemented with more intensity. The key
monetary action was to mop up liquidity in the economy. The actions taken
included the increase in minimum reserve requirements of commercial banks
and requiring parastatals to deposit a kwacha equivalent of any external debt
that they had. Government bonds were also introduced.
Nominal interest rates were increased. Between the reintroduction of the
reforms in 1989 and September 1992 when the interest rates were liberalised,
the lending rate increased from 18.4% to 58.5% while the treasury bill rate
increased form 18.5% to 47 %. The exchange rate was devalued and later the
fixed exchange rate was abandoned for a crawling peg. In 1990, a two-tier
exchange rate system was introduced. The first tier was the official exchange
rate determined by BOZ under FEMAC and the second tier operated with a
market determined rate and was used for imports under the Open General
License System (OGL). Exporters of non-traditional exports were allowed to
retain 50% of their export earnings in foreign exchange.
Between 1989 and 1991, the inflation rate began to fall. The introduction of
multiparty politics in Zambia in 1991 disturbed the program as the then ruling
government began to back track on its commitments as a campaign strategy in
the run up to the general and presidential elections.
In October 1991, a new government was ushered into power. The program
implemented by the new government differed from the previous one only with
the pace and rigor with which it was implemented. From 1992, Zambia
entered a Rights Accumulation Program (RAP) which was meant to facilitate
the clearing of arrears on debt to the IMF, which upon completion would
allow Zambia access to a concessional loan facility with only 0.5 % annual
interest. The new program required tight monetary and fiscal policies. The
main goal for government policy was to control inflation although economic
growth remained the ultimate goal. To achieve this, a series of quarterly
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targets for domestic credit to the government, reserve money and specific
liberalisation measures were set. The Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) was
formed to implement tax reforms and improve revenue collection. The
government tried to implement the cash budget strategy started in 1993. This
strategy required that revenue had to be raised before it could be spent.
The government often missed the targets and to signal commitment to the
program, it accelerated the implementation of other conditionalities especially
those of liberalisation. Interest rates were liberalised in 1992. Within six
months, the lending rate had risen by over 260 percentage points from 47% in
December 1992 to 171% in June 1993. The deposit and treasury bill rates
increased over the same period from 46.8 % to 97.9 % and 47% to 164.9%
respectively.
Figure 1.2 shows that despite these rapid increases, similar increases in the
price level meant that real interest rates were positive only for a short time.
Two other features are worth noting Firstly, the deposit, treasury bill and
lending rates move quite closely in the early years of the reforms but the
spread increases quite significantly in the latter years especially for the savings
rate. Secondly, while both treasury bill and lending rates are positive a short
while after the reforms, deposit rates remained negative throughout the period
and are more so in the latter years of the sample period.
In 1992, export retention was extended to 100% for exporters of
non-traditional exports. In the same year, private bureaux de change
operations were legalised, the OGL list was expanded and the exchange rates
unified. In 1993, the exchange rate was liberalised and in 1994, the Exchange
Control Act was repealed, the OGL system abolished and the kwacha became
fully convertible.
Adam (1995) argues that some of these premature liberalisation measures
distorted the sequence of implementation of the reforms and imposed
significant costs to the economy. The open current account and full unification
of the bureau and official exchange rates erased the implicit tax revenue
accruing to the government from the private sector, since the government was
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the biggest purchaser of foreign exchange from the non-government sector.
Given the decision to have a cash budget, this reduction in revenue implied
significant fiscal strain.
The introduction of the auctioning of government debt in March 1993 allowed
treasury bill rates to be market determined. This increase led to increases in
deposit rates. This in turn reduced demand for base money and therefore
seigniorage revenue flowing to the government. This off course again imposed
a strain on the government budget. The high rates on treasury bills also
affected portfolio allocation. Investors started to invest more in treasury bills
than in productive investment. At the maturity of these bonds, the economy
tended to be very liquid (Brownbridge (1996)) leading to sharp increases in
money supply.
Bank regulation also needed to be reformed although this was done quite late
into the reforms. Until 1994, Prudential regulation and supervision lay in the
Banking Act of 1971 and the Bank of Zambia Act of 1985. The Banking Act
of 1971 did not cover building societies, the Post Office Savings Bank or any
other financial institutions established by the written law of Zambia. There
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Fig. 1.2: Inflation And Interest Rates (1984-2001)
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were parts of these regulations that made effective implementation difficult.
Firstly, the authority to issue and withdraw licences lay in the hands of the
registrar of banks appointed by the ministry of finance. This opened a window
for corruption and the existence of non-profitable banks. Secondly, the Act did
not provide for BOZ to issue and update prudential regulations. As a result,
some regulations were in operation even when their relevance had been eroded.
One such example is the minimum capital requirement. Until 1989, this
remained at two million kwacha, which was worth three million dollars in 1971
and only $150 000 in 1989. It was then revised to K20 million worth only $30
000 in 1994, when a new legal structure was put in place.
The Act was also unclear as to the qualifications and experience required of
managers and directors when applying for licences. Together with the low
capital requirements, this allowed for the opening up of badly capitalised and
managed banks after licensing was liberalised. There were no references to
insider lending or loan concentration and by the time such regulation came
into place, there were high levels of lending to directors and family members.
A new legal structure came in the form of the Banking and Financial services
Act (BFSA) 1994. By this time, there were a lot of banks that had opened
with very low levels of capital and poorly qualified staff. Many of these banks
had high levels of insider lending and non-performing loans. In 1990 with the
run up to the first multiparty elections in Zambia, Capital bank closed on
account of rumours of political interference and poor liquidity. In 1995,
Meridian BIAO also started to experience liquidity problems and the
government attempted to bail the bank out by providing funds.
The financing given to Meridien BIAO was very substantial and created a
significant fiscal deficit. It also undermined monetary policy significantly as it
increased liquidity in the economy. Despite the attempted bail out, the earlier
experience with Capital Bank had a contagion effect on the bank and in the
same year the bank was placed under receivership. Later the same year, three
other banks experienced similar problems and were all closed. Stricter
regulations were issued in early 1996 to try and avoid more bank closures.
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Specifically, foreign exchange regulations were strengthened and minimum
capital requirement was extended to include risk-weighted capital. Still, banks
continued to close. Of the 26 banks registered in December 1995, only 15 were
operational by April 2003.
Unlike the previous regulation, BFSA covers all bank and Non-bank Financial
institutions in Zambia. Licensing now falls under the registrar of Banks and
Financial Institutions based at BOZ. The new law sets out screening standards
for applicants and criteria include capital adequacy, the history of the
applicant and proposed associates, major shareholders and affiliates including
the character and qualifications of proposed directors and managers. The
supervisory capacities of BOZ have also been strengthened and a separate
supervisory and regulation department was created. To this effect, the first
Financial System Supervision report was issued in 1995. The purpose of the
report was to ”inform the financial sector, the minister of finance and the
general public about developments in the financial sector”. Bank inspections
are conducted and a system of prudential indicators for determining bank
solvency has been developed. Currently the BOZ conducts both on-site and
off-site examination of financial institutions. In 1997, the operation of the
clearinghouse was transferred from BOZ to commercial banks so that BOZ
would refrain from providing unsecured credit facilities to commercial banks.
Minimum capital requirement was also increased to two billion kwacha which
is currently an equivalent of just over $400 000. Despite these reforms in the
regulations, the bank of Zambia Act still provides that the governor of the
Bank of Zambia should comply to directives given by the minister of Finance.
This undermines both the independence of BOZ and its ability to deal with
issues such as insolvent banks as was the case with Meridien.
Despite the problems experienced, the RAP was successfully completed in
1995 and in December 1995, The IMF approved loans totaling $1313 million
and admitted Zambia onto the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
(ESAF). The major part of the loan ($1047 million) was provided under a
three-year ESAF arrangement and the remainder under a one year Structural
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Adjustment Facility (SAF) arrangement in support of the government’s
economic and financial reform program. The aim of the new program was to
strengthen macroeconomic stabilization efforts while consolidating and
advancing the structural reforms began under RAP. Specifically, the goal of
monetary policy was to keep inflation on a downward trend. The exchange
rate continued to float.
Currently, specific goals are set each year for growth in government credit, net
foreign assets and inflation.7 Open market operations have not worked very
well in the control of inflation. As a result, other instruments such as
statutory ratios, intervention in the foreign exchange market and restricting
lending to commercial banks have been used. Below is a table showing targets
and actual realizations of money and inflation. It is clear that these goals have
been missed each year. Annual inflation has mostly been upward since 1995.
The focus of monetary policy continues to be on inflation. There are serious
attempts at intensifying the use of open market operations and reducing the
reliance on cash and liquidity ratios. However this has proved rather difficult
as commercial banks are not very willing to participate in open market
operations. In 2001, the statutory reserve ratio was changed four times to try
and control the growth of money in the economy.
The Bank of Zambia in conjunction with the securities exchange commission is
also trying to develop the money market and the number of listed companies
on the stock market has increased. This should provide an alternate source of
investment capital and lead to economic growth. It is hoped that this will also
improve the effectiveness of monetary policy.
7 Zambia had a three year ESAF programme starting in 1999 and was completed in 2001.
The ESAF programme was renamed the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility in November
1999. these are more based on own country-owned poverty reduction strategies drawn by
each country with IMF assistance, and the participation of local civil society and development
partners
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Tab. 1.1: Targets and Realisations for Money and Inflation
Reserve Money M2 Inflation
1995 Target 88929 37% 35%
Actual 92004 40% 46%
1996 Target 99085 10% 27%
Actual 136030 28% 35%
1997 Target 182667 17% 15%
Actual 191819 24% 23%
1998 Target 19.6% 19.6% 15%
Actual 30.9 22,6% 30.6%
1999 Target 18.2 20.3% 20%
Actual 28.6% 29.2% 20.6%
2000 Target 19%
Actual 49.8% 37% 30.1%
2001 Target 11% 17,5%
Actual 42.5% 11.8% 18.7%
2002 Target 16.1% 13%
Actual 23.2% 26.7% 26.7%
Source:Mwenda (1999) and Bank Of Zambia
1.3 Summary and Conclusions
Economic reforms in Zambia have been fully implemented since late 1991. Of
the key reforms, are the reforms in the financial sector. The controls in the
financial sector led to a weak and repressed banking sector which together with
the state owned insurance and pension parastatals consisted almost the entire
financial system. Interest rates were removed, exchange rates freed, monetary
policy conduct reformed and administrative controls were also removed.
Since the reforms, the main goal of monetary policy has been to achieve price
and financial system stabilisation as spelled out in The Bank Of Zambia Act
1996. This has involved mainly controlling the growth in money supply
through direct and indirect instruments. The reliance upon direct instruments
of monetary policy is slowly being diminished and indirect methods are being
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emphasised. Open market-type operations using primary auctions of treasury
bills and government bonds and auctions of short-term credit and term
deposits have been used. The central bank also auctions foreign exchange both
to smooth exchange rate fluctuations and also to accumulate foreign reserves
on behalf of the government. Money supply has continued to grow at levels
higher than targeted. Despite the reforms, real deposit interest rates have
remained negative. The nominal exchange rate has been depreciating
prompting increased intervention from the central bank. Although the control
of inflation is still difficult, annual inflation rates have reduced significantly
compared to levels achieved in the early 1990s. The main focus remains on
reducing inflation but as an aid to stabilisation, the central bank is investing
in the development of the money and inter-bank markets.
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Appendix
Tab. 1.2: Selected Economic Indicators (1970-2001)
YEAR 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Macroeconomic Indicators
NGDP growth 105.4 92.6 160.9 183.4 54.1 33.8 31.6 31 16.6 44.7 67.1
RGDP growth -0.5 -0.1 2.1 -0.2 -8.6 -2.3 6.6 3.3 -2.0 0.32 5.9 5.2
IIP 96.3 90 96.7 88.3 77.3 73.1 71.3 77.1 68.6 52.82 37.56 42.57
CPI 4.7 9.3 26.1 59.6 82.5 120.4 162.2 240.2 298.9 408.1 531 630.3
X/GDP 37.3 25.9 28.4 19.4 32.2 15.5 32 42 28 35 31.02 21.2
Financial Sector Indicators
M2/GDP 26 28 18.6 14.4 15.5 18.1 18.4 17.4 17.7 19.62 25.1 15.7
M1/GDP 13.27 11 8.95 6.48 5.09 7.61 6.84 6.87 6.37 7.27 7.89 6.02
tbill rate 34 42 54 122.5 24.8 51.5 69.8 23.3 43.6 36.2 31.4 47.2
Lending rate 40 46 60.6 119.6 45.8 66.7 69 37.2 37.4 42.6 37.6 45.2
savings rate 27 33 43 80.9 13.3 30.6 30.2 16.5 7.6 7.6 7.1 7.1
K$ 42.75 88.97 360 500 680 956 1283 1415 2299 2632 4158 3820
Source:Bank Of Zambia, World Bank and MOFED
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2. MONETARY POLICY REFORMS AND THE
TRANSMISSION MECHANISM IN ZAMBIA
ABSTRACT
In the paper, we look at the monetary transmission mechanism in Zambia. Using
different variables as measures of monetary policy shocks alternately, we examine
variance decompositions and impulse response functions to see whether the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy to the macro-economy has changed since
the reforms. Contractionary monetary policy is followed by a fall in both output and
prices. When we compare the two estimation periods, we find that both the
responsiveness and magnitude of forecast error variances of prices explained by these
variables have increased since the reforms. The results also show that most of the
impact lags have reduced. We find evidence of the bank lending channel both before
and after the reforms. Of the mechanisms estimated, the exchange rate mechanism
seems to be the most important mechanism for transmission of policy shocks to both
prices and output during the post-reform period.
Keywords: Monetary policy,Transmission mechanisms, Reforms.
JEL Classifications:E52 P41 P51.
2.1 Introduction
For almost two decades after independence, the financial sector in Zambia was
highly controlled. Monetary policy was conducted using direct instruments
such as controlled interest rates, controlled lending, capital controls and other
administrative controls. In 1991, the country embarked on economic reforms of
which a major aspect was financial reforms.
One of the main facets of financial reforms was the reform of monetary policy,
a move from direct to indirect instruments of policy. The idea was to remove
the financial repression believed to have come along with the controls and let
the market operate more efficiently. However, the structural changes that take
place as an economy reforms can change the inter-relationships amongst the
macro variables within the economy. If this happens, the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy to the macro economy may also be affected.
Increasingly, stabilisation policy has become the centre of macroeconomic
management in Zambia and this has been placed in the hands of the monetary
authority. It is therefore important to understand how monetary policy
changes affect the economy. Under the current policy set up, annual goals are
set for inflation and output and the precision with which policy changes affect
these goals depends on both the magnitude of the policy effects and the
impact lags of these policy changes. Understanding the path that policy
changes take to impact the macro-economy is important. Very little empirical
work has been done on the monetary transmission mechanism in Africa and
we could not access any such studies on Zambia. Given that African
economies are different in some fundamental ways from western economies on
which most empirical work on transmission mechanisms has been done, studies
such as this one could offer very valuable information about how African
economies work. Such information is invaluable in the design of more eclectic
monetary policy as monetary and financial sectors in African economies such
as Zambia’s become more advanced.
In this paper we look at the transmission mechanism in Zambia before and
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after the reforms. We employ the Vector Auto Regression (VAR) methodology
to look at the magnitude of the effects of policy changes and their impact lags
on output and inflation. We then compare how the mechanism has changed
since the reforms. We estimate different systems for each period using
alternate measures of policy shocks.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we review both the theoretical
and empirical literature. We outline the policy implementation procedures
before and after the reforms in section 3. In section 4, the methodology and
the data are discussed. The results are discussed in section 5 and we
summarise and conclude in section 6.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Theoretical Review
Inflation in an economy can be caused in a number of ways. One of such ways
is excess aggregate demand. This excess demand will increase prices because
of increased production costs and also because increased demand bids up
prices. Production costs can also affect inflation independent of excess
demand. Such cost increases can result from higher wages or increases in the
exchange rate (which in turn increases the cost of imported intermediate
inputs). Prices and wages are affected by expectations of future inflation since
future prices are the starting point for future wage bargaining and price
setting. Any increased inflationary expectations generated by different
variables such as the exchange rate movements or changes in the levels of the
interest rate will independently lead to increases in inflation.
The path which changes in monetary policy take from the implementation of
the policy to the macro-economy is referred to as the monetary policy
transmission mechanism. The theory on monetary transmission mechanisms
can broadly be divided into two views which are often referred to as the
money view and the lending or credit view.
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The Money View
The money view is based on the IS-LM approach. The basic mechanism here
is that contractionary monetary policy leads to higher interest rates via the
demand for transactions balances, which in turn affects output (IS curve). Let
M be money supply, i be the real interest rate, Y economic activity or output.
We can schematically represent the transmission mechanism as:
↑M ⇒↓ i⇒↑ I ⇒↑ Y
A fall in i would stimulate both business and consumer spending increasing
investment which in turn affects output upwards (see Taylor (1983), Meltzer
(1995), Mishikin (1996),Rabin and Yeager (1997) ). This view emphasises the
real rather than the nominal interest rates. The relationship between real and
nominal interest rates is often guided by the assumption of temporary wage or
price rigidities (see Taylor (1983)). When the nominal rate changes, the
sluggish response in prices leads to a change in the real interest rate. In
practice, most central banks set the interest rate rather than using money
supply as the instrument. The transmission mechanism therefore, in this view
includes a description of the central bank’s reaction function showing how the
central bank adjusts the interest rate in response to changes in the economy.
Other asset price channels include the exchange rate channels and the equity
prices channel. The exchange rate channel mainly operates through net
exports. When there are free capital flows, this channel also improves the
operation of the interest rate channel (through a form of Mundell-Fleming
mechanism). When domestic interest rates fall, there will be capital outflows
depreciating the exchange rate and then an expansion in net exports. Let E be
the exchange rate measured as units of domestic currency per unit of foreign
currency and NX net exports. Schematically then the mechanism is
↓ i⇒↑ E ⇒↑ NX ⇒↑ Y
The equity prices channel operates through Tobin’s q and through wealth
effects. Tobin’s q is the market value of a firm divided by the replacement cost
29
of capital. If q is high, the value of the firm is high compared to the
replacement cost of the capital. A rise in money supply leaves the public liquid
so that they have resources to spend on the stock market for acquisition of
equities and equity prices rise which in turn raises Tobins q increasing
investment spending and output.1
The Credit View
This view emphasises asymmetric information in financial markets. The two
channels of transmission are bank lending and the balance sheet channels. The
Bank lending channel is based on the assumption that banks are best suited to
solve problems of asymmetric information in credit markets. When there is
asymmetry of information, problems arise with a certain group of borrowers.
This group comprises mainly small firms and individual households who only
have access to credit through banks. Without substitutability of retail banks’
deposits with other sources of funds, the central bank will affect both the
deposits and loanable funds that banks make available to this group of
borrowers. Expansionary monetary policy increases bank reserves and deposits
increasing loanable funds and thereby increasing investment and consequently
output . This causes banks to lend more and investment rises
↑ D ⇒↑ L⇒↑ I ⇒↑ Y
Where D is deposits and L is lending. The Balance sheet channel operates
through decisions of firms and households and is based on the networth of the
borrowers. If the borrowers have a low net worth, then they have low value
collateral for loans and therefore are higher risk borrowers. With asymmetric
information, adverse selection problems arise because banks cannot distinguish
between high risk and low risk borrowers. Moral hazard problems will also
arise when there is an increased likelihood of high risk investment by these
borrowers. As a result, banks will set high interest rates to compensate for
1 A more Keynesian explanation would be that a rise in money supply would reduce interest
rates making bonds less attractive than equity
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lending risk. This reduces investment lending and lowers output. Since it is
the nominal interest rate that affects borrowers’ cash flows, it is the short-term
nominal interest rate rather than the real long-term interest rate that is
important in this mechanism.
The lending view in many cases is not seen as an alternative to the money
view but rather ”as a set of factors that amplify and propagate conventional
interest rate effects” (Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). When intermediated
loans and market bonds are perfect substitutes, we are back to the traditional
money view as loans and bonds will be identically priced in equilibrium.
However, because of information asymmetries, this rarely happens and a credit
channel usually operates.
Monetary policy can also operate through changes in the general price level.
This happens because in general, contracts are drawn in nominal terms. When
monetary policy changes (the money supply and hence prices), the real value
of contracts changes. On the one hand, unexpected expansionary monetary
policy increases prices and thereby improves the net worth of firms by
reducing the real value of their debts. This reduces the problems of adverse
selection and moral hazard so that investments increase and hence output. On
the other hand, expected monetary policy increases prices through contract
adjustment or indexation. The transmission mechanism schema is similar to
the one above.
2.2.2 Mechanisms in Developing Countries
Developing countries have financial structures that are somewhat different
from industrialised countries. This was more pronounced before most of the
developing countries embarked on financial reforms. In these countries the
menu of assets available to private agents is very limited. Despite the reforms,
financial markets in these countries are still quite underdeveloped. Securities
markets are either undeveloped or non-existent and most of the financial
transactions in these economies are handled by commercial banks. This means
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that some of the transmission mechanisms discussed above would not be
operative in these countries.
For such countries, alternative transmission mechanisms may exist. One initial
development that has been used in reformed financial markets is the
development of primary issues such as treasury bills and /or central bank bills
supported by restructuring the central bank discount window to allow for a
greater role for market forces. Once the monetary authority has set its
objectives, it compares the estimated supply and demand of reserves in the
banking system. Using this, the net cash reserve requirement is forecast and
the sale or purchase of bills is used to achieve the desired objective. Here we
can identify a transmission mechanism.
↑ NTB ⇒↑ NCR ↓ i⇒↑ L⇒↑ Y
NTB is net treasury bills and NCR is net cash reserves
Central banks may also intervene to manage short-term fluctuations in
liquidity. One such facility is the discount window through which the central
bank can lend to commercial banks. By adjusting the rate in this window, it
can affect financial market rates. Expansionary policy for example would
require the central bank to lower the discount rate, which makes cheaper funds
available and increases liquidity in the economy, reducing interest rates and
hence increasing investment and output. Let id be the discount rate. The
mechanism can be schematised as
↓ id ⇒↑ L⇒↑ I ⇒↑ Y
In most of these countries, there are efforts to develop money and inter-bank
markets which would then make it easier for monetary authorities to practice
more conventional monetary policy.
2.2.3 Empirical Review
In this section, we review some studies on the transmission mechanisms. We
could not access any studies that evaluated the impact of reforms on the
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transmission mechanism. Instead, we review general studies on transmission
mechanisms and in addition review two studies that look at monetary policy
reforms in Zambia.
A lot of recent empirical work on the transmission mechanism has been done
using the VAR approach. Sims (1992), estimates separate VARs for Germany,
France, the United Kingdom and the United States using monthly data. His
variables include industrial production, consumer prices, and a short interest
rate as measure of monetary policy, a measure of money supply, an exchange
rate index and an index of commodity prices. He makes the identifying
restriction that the interest rate variable potentially affects other variables
contemporaneously while the interest rate is not affected by innovations in any
of the other variables. He finds that the response of output to interest rate
innovations is similar in all countries examined. Output has a hump shaped
response to monetary policy shocks.
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) do a study on the credit channel in the US using
the federal funds rate, unemployment rate, log of CPI, deposits, loans and
securities. The identifying assumption is similar to that of Sims (1992) so that
monetary policy is predetermined. They find that both the conventional
money demand and the credit mechanisms operate. A positive shock to the
federal funds rate reduces the volume of deposits held by institutions
immediately after the shock and peaks after nine months. After a period of two
years, the entire long run impact of the decline in deposits is reflected in loans.
They conclude that their findings support the operation of a credit channel.
Christiaono et al. (1994) use US quarterly data to study the effect of monetary
policy shocks. They make similar identifying assumptions as Sims (1992)and
explicitly include commodity prices to avoid the price puzzle. Their variables
include real GDP, the GDP deflator, commodity prices, federal fund rate,
non-borrowed reserves, total reserves and net funds raised through financial
markets. The policy variables used alternately were the federal funds rate and
non-borrowed reserves. Their results show that the initial effect of a positive
shock to the federal funds rate is to increase net funds raised by the business
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sector for almost a year which declines thereafter.
A study by Anti-Ego (2000)) compares alternative domestic monetary policy
strategies in Uganda. He uses base money growth, changes in the treasury bill
rate, inflation and output growth to estimate a VAR with two alternate
orderings, one reflecting a reactive and another a proactive monetary policy
stance. His estimation period spans between 1982 and 1997. Using Granger
causality tests, he finds that the treasury bill rate has not been important for
movements in prices while base money has been. Complementing this analysis,
he estimates some variance decompositions. He finds that inflation mainly
explains its own movements in the first five quarters after which base money
becomes important explaining about 30% of the variations in the reactive
ordering and about 40% of the variations using the proactive ordering. The
treasury bill rate explain about 20% of the long run inflation movements. He
finds that own shocks and shocks to GDP mainly explain treasury bill rate
movements. The treasury bill rate explains about 30% of the movements in
growth.
A study of the credit channel in Uganda by Nannyonjo (2001) uses the VAR
methodology. The macro variables used in the study are the index of industrial
production and the consumer price index. The policy variable used is base
money. By looking at Granger causality tests and variance decompositions she
concludes that there is no significant role for either bank loans or the lending
rate in the transmission of monetary policy shocks to output. She finds that
output explains as much as 37% of variations in bank loans after two years
indicating demand driven lending in Uganda. The impulse responses estimated
however indicate a positive though delayed effect of bank lending on output.
Although these results are not directly comparable with those of Atingi-Ego
since the two studies use different variables and address different problems,
both studies find that base money is important for price movements (in the
Antingi-Ego study the contributions of base money are much larger).
Mwenda (1993) looks at monetary policy effectiveness in Zambia. In his study,
he evaluates the impact of switching to indirect monetary policy instruments
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on the growth and variability in broad money and inflation. The period of
direct controls in the study covers January 1988 to October 1992. The period
of indirect controls is between November 1992 and July 1997. He estimates
autoregressive models to determine whether significant reductions in the
growth of money supply and inflation have been observed since the switch to
indirect policy instruments. He also examines the volatility in the two
variables to see if there has been a reduction in the instability of these
variables over the same period. He finds that whereas the growth of monthly
inflation has fallen, money supply has continued to grow rapidly. The results
also show that the switch in policy has been effective in reducing variability in
both money supply and inflation.
Adam (1999) also looked at monetary policy reform in Zambia. He approaches
the problem by estimating a currency demand function with portfolio shifts.
He estimates a model using the treasury bill rate, deposit rates of interest, the
depreciation of the parallel exchange rate, inflation, currency in circulation
and the real Gross National Income. He finds evidence of a stable long run
currency demand function with a policy induced structural break. He also
finds that there is a marked increase in the underlying variance of currency
demand from about 1989, which begins to reduce around 1994. His results
suggest that because of the observed short run forecast variance around the
money demand function, stabilization policy based on controlling reserve
money is likely to have an imprecise link to inflation in the short to medium
term despite the long run correspondence between the two.
In light of the review above, the contribution of this paper lies in the analysis
of the transmission mechanism in Zambia. We have not been able to access
any work on transmission mechanisms that has been done on Zambia. In
addition such studies on African countries are very few and only two are
accessible to the author. With stabilisation policy increasingly being the
centre of macroeconomic management and almost entirely in the hands of the
monetary authority, understanding the transmission path of monetary policy
changes to the macroeconomy is key.
35
2.3 Monetary Policy Implementation
Until 1991, monetary policy in Zambia was conducted using direct
instruments. The objective of monetary policy was output growth. Inspired by
the development theories of the day, interest rates were controlled to keep
investment capital costs low. The bias was towards local businessmen so that
when lending to indigenous businessmen did not increase, more controls were
put in place. Lending was directed and a given percentage of all bank credit
was to be given to selected sectors in the economy. The composition of bank
boards of directors were to be at least 51% Zambian.
Other controls that affected monetary policy included a fixed exchange rate
and capital controls. Exporters had to surrender all foreign exchange earnings
to the central bank, which would then redistribute these through commercial
banks. During this period, money supply grew mainly as a result of deficit
financing. To control the growth of money, the central bank set high statutory
ratios and changed these quite frequently.
In 1992, monetary policy reforms began to be implemented. Interest rates
were freed and the exchange rate was liberalised the following year. The main
goal of monetary policy changed from output growth to the control of
inflation. In terms of actual policy implementation, the reforms entailed
shifting the emphasis from statutory ratios to more indirect methods. Efforts
towards this were started in 1993 and by 1995, open market operations had
replaced the frequent use of statutory ratios as the prime instrument of policy.
The framework used in the post reform period rests on four identities and we
discuss each in turn.
The Equation of Exchange
MV = PY (2.1)
Where M is Money supply, V is Money Velocity, P is the price level and Y is
the output. Under classical assumptions, V is assumed to be constant and Y
at full employment. This implies that changes in M will translate into changes
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in P. In reality, prices respond sluggishly so that in the short run, changes in
M translate into changes in both Y and P. Goals for GDP and inflation are set
annually assuming a short run situation and a constant annual velocity.
Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Central Bank
where reserve money(Mh) is a sum of net domestic assets (NDA) and net
foreign assets (NFA).
Mh = NDA+NFA (2.2)
NDA can be broken down into credit to the government (Dcg), credit to
non-government (Dcp) and other net items (ONI). We can then expand
equation 2.2 such that
Mh = Dcg +Dcp +ONI +NFA (2.3)
so that
∆Mh = ∆Dcg +∆Dcp +∆ONI +∆NFA (2.4)
A change in reserve money is an effect of changes in credit to the government,
credit to the public and net foreign reserves. The movements in NFA depend
on whether there are capital controls or not. With capital controls, the
movement of private funds is blocked and the change in reserves equals the
trade balance. When capital controls are removed, as was done with the
reforms, private funds flow freely and changes in reserves correspond to the net
results of the Balance of Payments. A trade surplus (deficit) increases
(decreases) high-powered money.
Balance of Payments Identity
CA = ∆Mh−K (2.5)
or
CA = PY − arbsorption (2.6)
Where CA is current account and K is capital flows.
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Given this framework, BOZ sits with the IMF and World Bank representatives
and sets growth paths for the key variables in the model. First the target
variables (inflation and economic growth) are set. Then the growth rate for
broad money is set. Velocity is calculated as Y/M2 and assumed constant
through the year. Then the growth rate for reserve money as the operational
target is set. The components of reserve money are then broken down and the
growth paths for them are also set. Discretionary monetary policy is estimated
by subtracting NDA from estimated operating target levels for reserve money.
Before the reforms, the government implemented conflicting policies so that it
was not easy to disentangle the operation of the interest rate mechanism.
Keeping interest rates low would trigger increased investment and therefore
output. On the other hand simultaneously liquidity was also controlled
through the use of statutory ratios. An increase in ratios would trigger a
decrease in money supply. The policy process during this period therefore was
not very clear, since both interest rates and money supply were being
adjusted, sometimes simultaneously. However, we know from theory that a
change in both statutory ratios and the interest rate will affect base money
and therefore money supply. This in turn will affect prices and output. We
assume that despite the rigidities in the economy at the time, the market was
working enough to enable the transmission of monetary policy through interest
rates to the macro economy.
After the reforms, BOZ implemented policy based mainly on equation 2.2
above. We can rewrite this equation to emphasise how BOZ can influence
movements in reserve money. Reserve money is a sum of currency and
reserves. Reserves are comprised of required and excess reserves while banks
also hold vault cash to make daily payments. We write this relation in the
equation below.
Mh = C +RR+ ER+ V C (2.7)
Where C is currency in circulation, ER and RR are excess and required
reserves and VC vault cash. Because currency is negatively related to interest
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rates, BOZ can reduce (increase) reserves by raising (lowering) the interest
rate through open market operations, the discount window and other indirect
methods. BOZ can also influence money supply by adjusting reserve
requirements. The key element in this process is the money multiplier whose
relationship with reserve money and money supply can be depicted as below.
M = βMh (2.8)
where β = ( cd+1cd+rr ) cd is the currency deposit ratio and rr the required reserve
ratio. Given this, BOZ can adjust reserve money in the economy by raising
and lowering reserve and other statutory ratios.
In practice, the principal instruments of policy include open market operations
with reserve or base money as the instrument. The starting point is forecasting
liquidity. Given the end of year broad money targets, desired paths for reserve
money are derived. Then individual components of reserve money are arrived
at. The projected paths for these variables are then used as the main
benchmark for monetary policy operations. Implementation of policy now
takes the form of minimising deviations of the actual paths of these variables
from their projected target levels. Daily liquidity control is done through the
auctioning of primary government securities, outright purchase and sale of
treasury bills and auctioning of term deposits and secured loans. Because open
market operations have not always been effective, other policy variables used
include statutory ratios, foreign exchange intervention and moral suasion.
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2.4 Methodology
In line with much of the research on monetary transmission mechanisms, a
VAR is estimated. We estimate VARs for the period before and after the
reforms to see if the response of macro variables to policy has changed since
the reforms. This is a good approach to discriminate between alternative
theoretical models of the economy and also capture the main properties of the
time series of money and output, while allowing us to impose minimum
restrictions to identify policy (see Baglioano and Favero (1998), Sderlind
(1999)).
Given that central banks operate systematically using some form of policy
rule, the VAR approach concentrates on deviations from this rule. Such
deviations may result from changing the systematic component of monetary
policy or from exogenous shocks. Deviations from the rule allow us to observe
the response of the economy to monetary impulses that are not expected by
the market. Since it is often the case that BOZ uses instruments not in its
’policy rule’, it is possible that the unsystematic part of policy in Zambia may
actually be quite substantial. It is also important to note that the purpose of
the paper is to look a the historical responses of variables in the economy
rather than to make any policy simulations.
In view of the Lucas critique, separate systems are estimated for the two
different policy regimes considered.2 The results in Adam (1999) give us reason
to believe that there is stability in money demand in Zambia despite the policy
shift. Since the monetary policy in Zambia relies heavily on this fact, we
assume a stable policy environment and comfortably use the VAR approach.
Let us consider a bivariate AR(1) model. Let yt be a measure of real economic
activity or macroeconomic indicators such as GDP or inflation. Let xt be the
monetary policy variable such as the interest rate or reserve money. A VAR
2 Lucas (1976) argued that the parameters of traditional macroeconometric models de-
pended implicitly on agents’ expectations of the policy process and were unlikely to remain
stable as policy makers changed their behaviour. The implication for this is that parameters
of backward looking models will shift between policy regimes.
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system can be written as follows yt
xt
 = A0 +A[L]
 yt−1
xt−1
+
 uyt
uxt

A(0) is s vector of constants, A (L) a 2 X 2 matrix polynomial in the lag
operator L, and uit serially independent errors for variable i.
Suppose the structural equations can be represented as follows
yt = b10 − b12xt + b11yt−1 + b13xt−1 + uyt (2.9)
xt = b20 − b21yt + b22yt−1 + b23xt−1 + uxt (2.10)
which can be re-written as
yt + b12xt = b10 + b11yt−1 + b13xt−1 + uyt (2.11)
xt + b21yt = b20 + b22yt−1 + b23xt−1 + uxt (2.12)
and in matrix form 1 b12
b21 1
 yt
xt
 =
 b10
b20
+
 b11 b13
b21 b23
 yt−1
xt−1
+
 uyt
uxt

let
B =
 1 b12
b21 1

,
X =
 yt
xt

Π0 =
 b10
b20

and
Π1 =
 b11 b13
b22 b23

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which allows us to write a more compact form of the structural equation as
BXt = Π0 +Π1Xt−1 + uit.
Assuming that B is invertible, we pre-multiply the equation by B−1 to obtain
Xt = A0 +A1Xt−1 + εit (2.13)
where
A0 = B−1Π0
A1 = B−1Π1
and εt = B−1uit
Given that aij is the element of the ith row and jth column, we can now write
our VAR in standard form.
yt = a10 + a11yt−1 + a12xt−1 + εyt (2.14)
xt = a20 + a21yt−1 + a22xt−1 + εxt (2.15)
and in matrix form,
 yt
xt
 =
 a10
a20
+
 a11 a12
a21 a22
+
 εyt
εxt
 (2.16)
Note that the errors are a composite of two errors uyt and uxt since
εt = B−1uit i.e.  εyt
εxt
 =
 1 b12
b21 1
−1  uyt
uxt

so that
εyt =
uyt − b12uxt
1− b12b21 (2.17)
εxt =
uxt − b21uyt
1− b12b21 (2.18)
Since the uits are white noise, so are the εts.
From (2.17) and (2.18), we can see that policy errors can be caused by
exogenous y and policy disturbances. Let Σu be the 2X2 variance-covariance
matrix of uit and Σε that of εit. Then Σε = BΣuB′. To determine the impact
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of policy on output, we need to look at the effect of uxt but unless b21 = 0, εxt
is not equal to uxt and therefore does not provide a measure of the policy
shock. If we estimate our VAR in (2.14)and (2.15) as it is, B and Σu will not
be identified without further restrictions since estimation of the reduced form
in (2.14) and (2.15)will yield less parameters than the structural form in (2.9).
One of the most common restrictions is to assume that the structural shocks
are uncorrelated so that the off diagonal elements in the covariance matrix are
zero (Sims (1972) Bernanke and Blinder (1992)). Specifically, two approaches
have been followed. The first one is to restrict the B matrix so that b21 in
equation (2.9) equals zero. In this case, the policy innovations are exogenous
with respect non-policy innovations. The underlying assumption here is that
policy does not respond contemporaneously to macro shocks, which may be
due to information lags. The second restriction assumes b12= 0 so that policy
shocks have no contemporaneous impact on the macro variables. Both of these
restrictions are based on the Choleski decomposition. In the first restriction,
policy variables are ordered first while in the second, non-policy variables are
ordered first. Because of the nature of this decomposition, the ordering of the
variables is very important particularly if correlation between the residuals is
high.
Another method used is to place restrictions on the long run effects of
disturbances in the variables (Blanchard and Watson (1986), Blanchard and
Quah (1989), Hutchinson and Walsh (1992)). A typical restriction here is that
long run demand shocks have a zero impact on output. Typically the A matrix
in (2.16) is set to identity. Some of the variables must be non-stationary and
some shocks must be restricted to have only short run effects.
Identification is also achieved through structural VAR modelling with
contemporaneous restrictions (Christiaono et al. (1996) Leeper et al. (1996)).
In this identification scheme, a priori information is used to impose restrictions
on the elements of the A matrix. These restrictions include assuming
orthogonality of the structural disturbances, imposing that macroeconomic
variables do not simultaneously react to monetary variables while feed back in
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the other direction is allowed, and imposing restrictions on the monetary block
of the model reflecting the operating procedures of the monetary policy
authority.
Two results obtained from VARs that are useful for analysing transmission
mechanisms are impulse response functions and forecast error variance
decompositions. The impulse responses tell us how macro variables respond to
shocks in the policy variables, while the variance decompositions show the
magnitude of the variations in the macro variables due to the policy variables.
If we assume our system is stable, we can iterate ( 2.13) backwards and let n
approach infinity and solve to obtain
Xt = µ+
∞∑
i=0
Ai1εt−i (2.19)
where the µs are the means of yt and xt
and use ( 2.16) to get
 yt
xt
 =
 µy
µx
+ 1
1− b12b21
∞∑
i=0
 a11 a12
a21 a22
 1 −b12
−b21 1
 uyt
uxt

(2.20)
We define the 2 X 2 matrix as Ψ(i) with elements Ψjk(i) such that
Ψ(i) =
Ai1
1− b12b21
 1 b12
b21 1

and we write in moving average form as yt
xt
 =
 µy
µx
+ ∞∑
i=0
 Ψ11(i) Ψ12(i)
Ψ21(i) Ψ22(i)
 uyt−i
uxt−i

or in a more compact form
Xt = µ+
∞∑
i=0
Ψ(i)ut−i (2.21)
Ψjk(i) are the impulse response functions. As we vary (i), we get a function
describing the response of variable j to an impulse in variable k. For example,
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the cumulated effects of uxt on the yt sequence is
∑n
i=0Ψ12(i).Letting n
approach infinity gives us the long run multiplier.
To derive the forecast error variance, let us use equation ( 2.21) to make a
forecast of xt+1. The one step ahead forecast error is Ψut+1 and in general the
n-period forecast error Xt+n − EtXt+n is
Xt+n − EXt+n =
∞∑
i=0
Ψ(i)ut+n−i (2.22)
and the mean square error (MSE).
(Xt+n − EXt+n)2 = σ2x
∞∑
i=0
Ψ(i) (2.23)
where σ2x is the variance of xt+n.
To show the decomposition more explicitly, let us narrow down on yt.
(yt+n − Eyt+n)2 = σ2y
∑
Ψ(i)2 (2.24)
The share of σ2x(n) due to uyt and uxt are
σ2y[Ψ11(0)
2 +Ψ11(1)2 + ....+Ψ11(n− 1)2]
σ2y(n)2
(2.25)
σ2x[Ψ11(0)
2 +Ψ11(1)2 + ....+Ψ11(n− 1)2]
σ2y(n)2
(2.26)
Since the variance decomposition tells us the share of the total variance
attributable to a given structural shock, for an exogenous sequence y, uxt will
not explain any of the forecast error variance of yt.
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2.5 Data
In this section we discuss the data used in the estimations. Given the
framework discussed in section 3, the variables used in the estimation include
real GDP (output), the composite consumer price CPI (price), the different
money aggregates (M2, base money=base), treasury bill rate (as short term
interest rate indicating policy stance), the weighted savings rate (used as an
indicator of policy in the pre-reform period), the lending rate (used to evaluate
the role of the bank lending channel), liquid asset ratios (lar, as a proxy for
operating ratios of commercial banks), the official exchange rate of the kwacha
to the dollar (NER), and total commercial bank lending (lending).
2.5.1 GDP
The output variable used in the study is real GDP. The raw data is available
in annual series and to obtain monthly series, we interpolated. In the
estimations, we use output data generated by the Denton interpolation
method. The Index of Industrial Production (IIP) is used as the related
series.3 For the post-reform period, the IIP series is available only at a
quarterly frequency. The interpolation is therefore done with this series to a
quarterly output series and then a simple linear interpolation method is used
to obtain a monthly series.
2.5.2 Price Level
For this variable, we use the log of the composite CPI. The control of inflation
measured as the annual growth rate of this variable is the main goal of
monetary policy and BOZ sets a target
3 The Denton Method for interpolating data uses an ’associated series’ imposing the con-
straint that the interpolated series must obey the annual totals. The indicator series con-
tributes its pattern to the series and adds more information especially where such movements
in such a series are closely related to the series to be interpolated. See Baum (2001) and
Renka (1988)
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Fig. 2.1: Real GDP Pre and Post-Reform
for this variable every year. It is the main goal of monetary policy. Figure
(2.2) shows the log of the CPI and its monthly and annual rates of change for
the period 1970 to 2001. In the top panel, we have the log of CPI, in the
middle panel, monthly inflation, and in the bottom panel, annual inflation.
During the period of controlled prices, inflation exhibits spikes of changes as
the prices were administratively controlled. Secondly, the period around 1989
and 1990 shows very huge jumps in CPI. This was mainly due to the
re-introduction of IMF policies. In 1987, ties with the IMF were broken and
the controls that had been removed earlier on commodities such as maize were
re-introduced. In 1989, ties with IMF were restored and prices decontrolled.
Food and maize subsidies were removed increasing prices quite significantly.
We notice large increases in prices in the early 1990s just after the reforms.
Simultaneous liberalisation in many markets led to rapid increases in prices
and inflation. Another notable change occurs around 1995. During this year,
inflation increased mainly due to two factors: banking crises and drought. A
number of banks went into distress in 1995. The government pumped 90
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billion kwacha into the banking sector to try and rescue a large bank and this
created inflationary pressures. This also strained the fiscal budget reinforcing
the inflationary pressures already at play. The drought also led to huge
increases in maize prices and together these forces led to an increase in annual
inflation from 26.8% in May 1995 to 46% by November of the same year. From
the late 1990s, there has been relative control of inflation reaching as low as
18.7% in December of 2001.
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Fig. 2.2: Consumer Price Index and Inflation
2.5.3 Monetary Aggregates
Monetary policy in Zambia is implemented by using M2 as the intermediate
target. Reserve money is used as the operating target and can be seen as a
monetary policy instrument. From the graphs below, we notice that growth in
all money aggregates has been fairly constant except for a few periods. In
1975/76 and around 1979, the world oil crises led to unexpected increases in
the fiscal deficits resulting in extensive borrowing and printing of money. This
led to large increases in money supply. After the break with IMF in 1987, there
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was pressure on the government budget due to the lack of donor inflows. The
government resorted to deficit financing leading to a rapid increase in money
supply. In 1990/91, the period running up to the elections, the government
printed a lot of money to finance the election campaigns and the election itself.
A sharp increase is also seen around 1995 and 1996 with the banking crises.
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Fig. 2.3: Monthly Growth in Monetary Aggregates
2.5.4 Liquid Asset Ratios
We distinguish between actual and required reserve requirements. Actual
liquid asset ratios are the actual ratios of reserves to liquid assets held by the
banking system and we use this variable to proxy reserve requirements for
both estimation periods. Required ratios are the minimum reserve to asset
ratios prescribed by the central that every commercial bank must hold with
the central bank. For the post-reform period, we use actual and required
ratios alternately. This distinction was not available for the pre-reform period.
Changes in minimum reserve ratios and other operating ratios were the main
monetary policy instrument used before the reforms. Although in the post
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reform period emphasis has been placed on more indirect methods of policy
implementation such as open market operations, operating ratios are still used
although less frequently. The variable is taken as one of the alternate policy
variables in policy implementation.
The top panel of figure (2.4) shows actual liquid asset ratios for the period
1970 to 2001. The observations between September 1977 and April 1978 are
unusually high. Since alternative sources of data could not be found, we used
the average for each year for those observations. The dotted part of the graph
shows a period when only quarterly data is available. The bottom panel of the
graph shows both the actual and required liquid ratios and the required rate
for 1994-2001. Focusing on the lower panel, we notice that apart from the
period between 1996 and 1998, actual liquid ratios are higher than required
reserves showing a significant amount of excess reserves in the banking system.
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Fig. 2.4: Actual and Required Asset Ratios
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2.5.5 Nominal Exchange Rate
The exchange rate used is the nominal exchange rate between the kwacha and
the dollar. Since 1992, the exchange rate system has been unified and in the
post reform period the bureau mid-rate4 is used. This variable has become an
important policy variable in that BOZ sometimes engages in foreign exchange
open market operations partly as a monetary policy tool and partly to accrue
foreign reserves on behalf of the government.
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Fig. 2.5: The Nominal Exchange Rate
The graph in figure 2.5 shows the log of the nominal exchange rate in the
upper panel and its growth rate in the lower panel. We notice a significant
increase in the exchange rate around 1985 when the exchange rate auction was
introduced. The official exchange rate of the kwacha to the dollar rose within
a month from K2.35/$ in September to K7.50/$ in October-an increase of well
over 200%! With the break in ties with IMF the exchange rate was once more
fixed between 1987 and 1989 when the auction was re-introduced and in 1992
the exchange rate became market determined.
4 The mid rate is calculated as a mean of the selling and buying exchange rates
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2.5.6 Interest Rates
Three different interest rates are used in the estimations. The treasury bill
and weighted savings rates are used alternately as short-term rates to capture
the stance of monetary policy. The treasury bill rate is used in the estimations
only in the post reform period as it was not used for policy purposes in the
pre-reform period. The lending rate is used to evaluate the bank lending
channel. The interest rates began to rise in the mid 1980s when the first
attempts at reform were made reaching their peak in 1993 with full reforms. A
decrease is observed after that reaching a low of 7% by December 2001. With
high inflation rates however, real interest rates remain negative even after the
reforms.
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Fig. 2.6: Interest Rates
Total commercial bank lending is used to test for the credit channel of
monetary transmission. From the graphs, we notice that total commercial
bank lending is growing much faster in nominal terms after the reforms.
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Fig. 2.7: Commercial Bank Loans
2.6 Estimation Results
In the discussion, we distinguish between policy and macro variables. The
policy variables include the interest rates, base money and the exchange rate.
Although the exchange rate may not strictly be viewed as a policy variable in
Zambia, the central bank often intervenes in foreign exchange markets either
to stabilise the exchange rate or to accumulate foreign reserves on behalf of
the government. It is this part of shocks to the economy that we hope to
capture by estimating an exchange rate mechanism. Innovations to M2 are
also interpreted as policy shocks although M2 is strictly used as an
intermediate target by the Bank of Zambia.
We begin by estimating variance decompositions of our macro variables. These
decompositions tell us the proportional contribution of policy shocks to
variations in a given macro variable. The larger the proportion of variation
that is attributable to a given policy variable, the more important is that
variable in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Although variance
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decompositions show the importance of a policy variable to movements in a
macro variable, the direction of these movements can only be observed from
the impulse responses. We will be able to see whether an impulse in a policy
variable leads to a fall or a rise in the macro variable. Again this gives us a
good idea of the transmission mechanism because we can see whether a given
policy action has a negative or positive impact on target variables.
Our identifying assumption is based on the fact that due to information
constraints, macro-variables have no contemporaneous effect on the policy
variables. This amounts to setting b21 in (2.10) equal to zero or using the
Choleski decomposition ordering the policy variables first. This assumption is
in line with the financial programming framework which assumes that
deviations of money supply from target means that inflation has also deviated
from target. This implies that in policy conduct, the central bank looks at the
movements in the instruments first. Because a number of policy variables are
used to implement policy by BOZ, we estimate different systems each
representing a possible mechanism for monetary policy.
In discussing the results, we conjecture that different transmission mechanisms
are at play. Since the different policy variables are changed sometimes
simultaneously, it would be interesting to see the responses in a VAR with all
variables included. However, due to the small sample size, we are unable to
estimate such a VAR. We estimate mechanisms that test both the money and
credit views of monetary transmission. In the money view, we estimate the
interest rate and exchange rate mechanisms. We also estimate a mechanism
that looks at the propagation of policy changes when money supply is
controlled by the use of statutory ratios.
The interest rate channel is based on using reserve or base money as the policy
instrument. From the open market operations, we know that BOZ auctions
short term debt and deposits to commercial banks. It forecasts liquidity
requirements then offers credit or debt to the banks who then offer rates at
which they will either deposit (for tightening policy) or borrow (for
expansionary policy) funds. The changes are then expected to translate into
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changes in money supply given the money multiplier. This should then cause
movements in prices and output. This model is considered as the base model
because it is the one that portrays the mechanism which best describes basic
monetary policy as conducted by BOZ. Hence we have our first mechanism.
↓Mh→↓M2→↑ i→↑↓ y →↓ p5
The second mechanism we estimate is based on the use of statutory ratios to
control growth in money supply. The mechanism becomes
↑ lar →↓M2→↑↓ y →↓ p
The exchange rate mechanism is based on BOZ activities in the foreign
exchange market. Through the sale and purchase of foreign exchange on the
open market, BOZ affects movements in money supply and prices. Using the
nominal exchange rate as the instrument, the third mechanism is schematised
as
↑M →↑ E ↑↓ y →↑ p
We also estimate a mechanism to evaluate the credit view. We estimate a
system to see whether monetary policy affects lending rates and total bank
lending. The mechanism is schematised as
↓M2→↑ i→↓ L→↑↓ y →↓ p
2.6.1 Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
We show in tables (2.1 and2.2) below the results for every 6th step
contributions of the policy variable innovations to price and output
5 In high inflation economies, monetary policy changes may have two opposing effects on
output. The first is the contractionary effect of falling money supply which increases interest
rates and has a negative effect on investment and hence output. The second is a positive
effect resulting from reduced costs of inflation such as the inflation tax, an unstable business
environment and other associated resource misallocations. The net result therefore depends
on which of these two forces is stronger although the contractionary effect is likely to have a
more immediate impact. The opposite will happen with expansionary policy
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decompositions for all the mechanisms estimated.67 The value in each cell is
the forecast error variance decomposition contribution of the innovations in
the policy variable in that column to the variations in the macro variable in
the corresponding row. For example reading the first cell in table 1, base
money contributes 2% to variations in output after 6 months while M2 and the
interest rate contribute 2% and 4% respectively.
Tab. 2.1: Output and Price Variance Decompositions -Pre Reform Period
horizon aMech1 bmech2 cmech.3 dmech.4
Mh M2 i lar M2 i E M2 M2 i L
y6 2 2 4 5 2 7 2 4 2 9 1
y12 3 3 7 5 2 7 13 2 2 21 2
y18 3 3 7 5 2 9 22 2 2 27 2
y24 4 3 8 5 2 10 29 2 2 29 2
p6 5 5 10 1 7 12 14 7 5 11 1
p12 5 4 13 2 6 15 29 6 4 10 1
p18 4 10 16 2 10 15 37 13 9 7 1
P24 3 20 19 2 17 15 41 18 18 7 0.4
The figure in each cell is the variance decomposition of output(y) and price(p)
attributed to innovations in the policy variable in each column.
aMechanism 1 (base money,M2, interest rate output, prices)
b mechanism 3 (asset ratios, M2, interest rate, output, prices)
c mech2(M2, exchange rates, output, prices)
d mechanism 4(M2, lending rate, lending,output,price)
From table (2.1), we notice that the contributions of innovations in most
policy variables to developments in prices and output during the pre-reform
period are quite small. During the first four months, movements in prices are
explained by own shocks. Thereafter, interest rates and the exchange rate
become important. Interest rate innovations explain just over 10% of price
6 Since that data is monthly, each step is equivalent to one month.
7 In the pre-reform period, the exchange rate is ordered before money supply since during
this period the exchange rate was fixed and money supply adjusted to maintain the level of
the exchange rate
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variations after one year and 18% after two years while exchange rates explain
29% after a year and 41% after two years. M2 shocks also become important
for price developments but only after well over a year contributing 20% to price
variations after two years. Innovations to interest rates and the exchange rate
explain relatively large amounts of the variations in output. After a year, the
lending rate explains 21% of output innovations and 29% after two years. The
exchange rate becomes significant for output developments after over a year
explaining 22% of output movements after 18 months and 29% after two years.
Tab. 2.2: Output and Price Variance Decompositions -Post Reform Period
horizon aMech1 bmech2 cmech.3 dmech.4
Mh M2 i lar M2 i M2 E M2 i L
y6 7 2 6 1 3 3 5 17 3 6 6
y12 8 5 7 1 4 4 6 17 4 6 7
y18 9 6 6 2 4 4 6 16 4 6 7
y24 9 6 6 2 4 5 6 17 4 6 7
p6 13 26 1 10 11 3 13 32 16 1 0.2
p12 12 27 1 47 21 1 28 55 23 1 0.3
p18 11 24 1 61 18 2 37 52 27 1 1
P24 10 22 2 67 15 3 42 48 32 1 2
The figure in each cell is the variance decomposition of output(y) and price(p)
attributed to innovations in the policy variable in each column.
aMechanism 1 (base money,M2, interest rate output, prices)
b mechanism 3 (asset ratios, M2, interest rate, output, prices)
c mech2(M2, exchange rates, output, prices)
d mechanism 4(M2, lending rate, lending,output,price)
Table (2.2) shows every 6th step of price and output decompositions for the
post-reform period. During this period, innovations to most policy variables
make large contributions to movements in prices. In the exchange rate channel
and when statutory ratios are used, prices account for only 32% and 20% of
own movements after a year respectively. Of the two money variables, M2
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becomes more important after the reforms contributing more to price
developments both at short and long horizons. In the base channel, M2
explains 22% of price variations. When statutory ratios are included, M2
explains only 15% of movements in prices while 67% is due to statutory ratios
8. In the exchange rate channel, the exchange rate explains as much as 55% of
price variations after one year and 48% after two years. In this channel, we
notice that while the exchange rate explains more variations prices, M2
explains more and more variations at longer horizons.
During the post-reform period, output variations are mainly due to own
innovations and innovations in the exchange rate. Base money and M2
together account for less than 20% of the developments in output after two
years in the interest rate channel. When statutory ratios are included, there is
no significant difference in the total money aggregates’ contribution. The
exchange rate becomes important for both short run and long run output
developments during this period explaining 17% of the variations within half a
year.
2.6.2 Response Functions
All the response function graphs are shown in the appendix. In figures (2.8)
and (2.9) below, we show the responses for the base model (mechanism one)
for both the pre-reform and post reform periods. With a few exceptions, the
main structure of the responses of prices and output to the policy variables is
the same before and after the reforms. The effect of base money and interest
rates in the pre-reform period is unexpected. A positive shock to base money
reduces prices while a shock to interest rates increases prices. This perverse
response could be due to price and interest rate controls that existed at the
time. For instance, an increase in base money would induce a desire on the
part of the government to keep prices low in a bid to control inflation.
Similarly, an increase in deposit rates would induce an increase in broader
8 Most variations in M2 are due to statutory ratios
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money holdings putting upward pressure on prices 9. As expected
contractionary monetary policy dampens output. In the pre reform period, a
positive shock to the interest rate and the exchange rate lead to a fall in
output. In the post-reform period, the responses to interest rates and the
exchange rate are larger but short lived. The initial effect of a positive shock
to the exchange rate is to reduce output which begins to increase after about
10 months.
9 Although prices were institutionally set, they were periodically changed depending on the
conditions in the economy
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Fig. 2.8: Pre-reform mechanism one
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Fig. 2.9: Post-reform mechanism one
2.6.3 Effect of the Reforms
In this section, we compare the estimations in the two periods. Firstly, the
responses of some of the variables are much larger and with shorter impact
lags in the post-reform period. For example, the response of output to
innovations in money aggregates is more immediate than in the pre-reform
period. The M2 innovations impact lags on prices also reduce to one month
during the post-reform period from 7 months before the reforms. That of
exchange rates on prices reduces from 4 months to 2 months. After the
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reforms, the exchange rate impacts output faster than before the reforms.
Contrary to Anti-Ego (2000)’s results on Uganda, the treasury bill rate affects
prices with a lag even after the reforms. The impact lags of the interest rates
on both prices and output on the other hand have not changed much.
The nature of output responses to exchange rate innovations has also changed.
In the pre-reform period, shocks to the exchange rate are followed by an initial
small increase in output in the first four months which becomes negative
thereafter. In the post-reform period, the initial impact is negative and lasts
about four months. The exchange rate becomes important for output
developments both in the short and long run during the post-reform period
compared to being important only after a long lag in the pre-reform period.
This is evident from the variance decompositions.
The behaviour in output can be explained by the nature of the Zambian
economy at the time and the way it has changed since the reforms. The
country was quite dependent on the external sector’s revenue to finance both
consumption and production. Copper exports were the main source of
revenues for government expenditure. Since a lot of socio-economic goods and
services were supplied by the government, shocks to the exchange rate affected
revenue and hence consumption significantly. The exchange rate also affected
production through the cost of imported inputs. The government had created
a lot of manufacturing firms during the import substitution era, which were
highly dependent on imports for their inputs. An increase in the exchange rate
would increase the cost of production and hence have a negative effect on
output. Since prices like exchange rates affect demand faster than supply, a
positive shock to the exchange rate would lead to an increase in output whose
effect may then wane as supply is later affected by increased production costs.
After the reforms however, the structure of the economy changed. A lot of the
industries set up under the import substitution strategy were closed or
privatised. The importance of copper exports in the economy reduced and
non-traditional exports such as flowers, fruit vegetable and animal products
started to contribute more to both export volumes and revenue. With the
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massive lay offs in the public sector under privatisation and public sector
reform, the informal sector expanded quite rapidly with a large increase in
petty trading and the informal sector as a whole. With these changes, retail
and services became larger components of output.
An explanation consistent with the observed change in the response of output
to the exchange rate lies in the way the exchange rate would affect the
different components of output in the new structure. A depreciation for
example would affect wholesale and retail activities first. Because this sector is
highly dependent on imported consumer goods, the initial impact would be to
raise domestic prices. The share of manufacturing and construction together
constitute on average 14% of output over the sample period. Wholesale, retail
and services on the other hand constitute about 50% of output. Over the same
period, public sector wages have hardly increased even in nominal terms and
private sector wages are negotiated only periodically. The increase in prices is
therefore not followed by an increase in output as would be expected but
rather a fall as inventories accumulate. The main components of export are
agricultural, whose output or supply responds to changes in prices with a lag.
After a while, as supply of the exportables increases along with foreign
demand resulting from the depreciation, output will also increase as observed.
Before the reforms, interest rates were important for movements in output but
this changes after the reforms. Both the treasury bill rate and the lending rate
explain small amounts of variations in output although output tends to
respond to innovations in the treasury bill rate more than to other policy
variables apart from the exchange rate. Total bank lending becomes more
important after the reforms although the changes are not as marked as in the
other variables. The withdrawal of extensive government involvement in
economic activity and the removal of various controls have allowed the private
sector to become more important. This has increased the importance of credit
in output developments. The presence of information asymmetries and other
forms of risk in the credit market may have hampered more expansion in
credit. Information asymmetries tend to lead to setting of high lending rates
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and reduction in total loans. This is evidenced in the high spread between the
deposit and lending rates (see figure(2.6)). Treasury bills have also offered an
alternative source of finance with the development of trading treasury bills on
the secondary money market. This may explain the importance of the
treasury bill rate for output movements.
Although we do not test the lending channel very rigorously in that a full test
of this channel requires bank and firm level data, we test the channel at a very
aggregate level by estimating the lending channel in mechanism four. We find
that the channel is more important before the reforms especially for output,
with the lending rate being the most important variable for output movements
before the reforms. After the reforms, the channel operates more through
shocks to actual lending compared to the pre-reform period when lending rates
were more important. Again this could be a result of the high lending rates.
Before the reforms, the government set a selective ceiling on the lending rates.
Selected firms (mostly government parastatals) and industries (mainly
agriculture) had access to loans at these low rates. After the reforms, these
firms and industries have to compete in the credit market with all other firms.
With high interest rates, only firms with sufficient collateral can have access to
credit.
When we look at the forecast error variance decomposition of bank lending, we
find that innovations to prices make the largest contribution to loan
movements.The M2 contribution is just over 10% showing that lending may
not be driven by monetary policy. This result agrees with the findings by
Nannyonjo (2001)on Uganda where although she finds an important role for
lending, she finds that lending is demand driven rather than determined by
monetary policy. It also appears that lending is not driven by its price as the
lending rate explains only 7% of movements in total loans even after two
years.10
The impact of the lending channel is weaker if the financial condition of the
10 some the results mentioned are not presented in tables 1 and 2 and are cited for clarity.
They are available from the author.
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banking sector is weak, particularly if bank capital is limited and bank loan
making is tied to risk based capital requirements (Kasyap and Stein 1994).
The new bank legislation enacted in 1994 tied loan making to risk based
capital with a maximum of 25% of capital per borrower . When a bank’s
ability to make loans is tied to its capital in this way, it is likely to hold more
bonds or treasury bills than it needs for liquidity purposes since it does not
have enough risk based capital to support more of the higher yielding loans.
As a share of total liquidity, commercial banks in Zambian hold very high
amounts of treasury bills. In 2001, treasury bill holdings averaged 68% of total
bank liquidity with rates being as high as 80% in some months (BOZ 2002).
This may indeed dilute the effect of the credit channel since the treasury bills
offer an alternative source of financing and policy changes meant to regulate
liquidity in the economy through loans will have little effect.
Financial sector fragmentation may also contribute to the limited impact of
the credit channel in the post-reform period. The increased size of the
informal sector where most of the traders lack collateral for formal sector loans
creates a parallel loan market to which most of these traders resort to for
financing. Although this phenomenon existed before the reforms, the size of
the parallel financial markets has increased after the reforms due to the
removal of ceilings, administrative controls and a decrease in formal
employment. This parallel market as a source of alternative financing dilutes
the effect of policy changes as do treasury bills for commercial banks both
through the money and credit channels.
The sluggish response of the lending rate to policy shocks may also dilute the
impact of credit on the economy. Since about 1998, the lending rate has
remained persistently high widening the spread between the lending and
deposit rates quite significantly. One of the reasons this could have happened
is the high operating costs and non-performing loans observed in Zambian
commercial banks. Banking industry non-performing loans were as high as
31% in 1997 with some bank’s rates being as high as 50% (Ndulo and Simatele
(1999)). Over the past five years, the level of non-performing loans in the
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industry have averaged 20% per year (BOZ (2002)). The effect of such costs is
that commercial banks set imprudently high lending rates to compensate for
lending risk. The result is that lending rates don’t fluctuate much in response
to policy but are rather influenced by risk assessment in the loans market.
The behaviour of the response of prices to interest rate shocks also changed
after the reforms. Our results show that a positive policy shock is followed by
an increase in prices. A problem arises when we interpret innovations to the
interest rate as an indicator of policy since a positive innovation to the interest
rate is followed by an increase in prices. This phenomenon in the literature
has been referred to as the ’price puzzle’. The price puzzle has often been
attributed to the exclusion of some leading indicators that are not in the
estimated system to which central banks react. One such indicator that has
been used is the commodity price index. We observe this behaviour in the
price level during the pre-reform period. Unfortunately, we could not access
any commodity price data to enable us to re-estimate the system to see if this
puzzle would disappear. In the post-reform period however, the price puzzle is
less obvious and disappears when the deposit rate of interest is used as an
indicator of policy rather than the treasury bill rate. This indicates that the
former may be a better indicator of the monetary stance of BOZ than the
treasury bill rate.
Unlike in the pre-reform period (when prices were controlled), inflation
exhibits persistence in the post-reform period. Although both indexation and
inflationary expectations may theoretically explain this behaviour in inflation,
the most plausible explanation is that of inflationary expectations. The reason
is that there is no extensive indexation in Zambia although implicit indexation
is very likely. Inflationary expectations on the other hand offer a more
plausible explanation due to the continuous failure of the central bank to meet
its inflation targets since the reforms. Monetary authority credibility is lost
this way and despite public announcements by the central bank about the
inflation goals, the public tends to build inflationary expectations in their
contracts.
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All the policy variables during the pre-reform period except for the deposit
rate (whose variations are due to operating ratios) are quite exogenous to the
estimated systems. After the reforms, we find that of the policy variables, only
the exchange rate is exogenous to the estimated system. There is quite a lot of
feed back to the monetary aggregates which explain as little as 25% of own
variations in some cases. When there is significant feedback from the
non-policy variables to the policy variables, policy implementation becomes
difficult. For example, movements in base money are mainly due to
innovations in M2. Developments in M2 are explained mainly by innovations
to the exchange rate, output and prices in the first year. Although this may
only reflect that policy is backward looking or reactive rather than proactive
or forward looking, it may also be that feedback from the macro- variables is
significant.
When we compare the different mechanisms, the exchange rate channel seems
to be the most important for developments in prices before the reforms while
both the exchange rate channel and the use of statutory ratios are most
important after the reforms. For developments in output, the lending and
exchange rate channels are the important channels before the reforms while the
exchange rate channel is the most important after the reforms. Most variations
are due to innovations in M2, statutory ratios and the exchange rate.
The results obtained in this study though not directly comparable with those
reviewed are not very different. We can relate to the two studies by Mwansa
(1998) on inflation in Zambia and Anti-Ego (2000) on Uganda. Although the
studies used different variables, both studies included prices and money and
the later study also included the treasury bill rate. Our study differs from the
one by Mwansa (1998) in the periods covered since half of the sample period
in Mwansa’s study covers a period before full implementation of the reforms.
However, our results on the role of exchange rates for prices are similar to his.
In both studies, the exchange rate is more important for price movements than
money supply. Anti-Ego finds an important role for the treasury bill rate in
both price and output movements and that base money impact lags to prices
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are significantly longer than those of the treasury bill rate. In line with his
results, we find that the treasury bill rate is important for output variations.
Our results on the price movements however differ. Unlike him, we find little
importance of the treasury bill rate for prices and its impact lags are not much
shorter than those of base money.
2.7 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, we estimated VAR systems for two periods in post-independence
Zambia; the pre-reform and post-reform periods. For each period, we used
alternative measures of monetary policy shocks and estimated four possible
transmission mechanisms. The first three mechanisms estimated fall under the
money view where in addition to base money movements, interest rate and
exchange rate innovations are interpreted as indicators of the stance of
monetary policy. We also tested the propagation of monetary policy when
money supply is controlled by the use of statutory reserves. We tested the
credit channel by estimating two VAR systems that include total bank lending
and the lending rate alternately.
The forecast error variances decompositions show that more of the variability
in prices and output are explained by shocks to money aggregates, the
exchange rate and statutory ratios after the reforms than before. Although the
money aggregates are important for explaining price movements, the exchange
rate seems to be more important for movements in both prices and output.
When both M2 and the exchange rate are put in the system, the exchange rate
explains more of the movements in both prices and output (more at shorter
horizons for prices). Of the policy variables, we find that only the exchange
rate is exogenous to the estimated systems. We also find a role for the credit
channel.
The impulse responses we estimate are plausible and in many cases reveal
standard results. We find that expansionary policy is followed by an increase
in prices. We also find that expansionary policy is followed by an increase in
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output albeit short lived in most cases. During the pre-reform period, we find
evidence of the perverse effects of price and interest rate controls. The results
show that the impact lags have reduced since the reforms. The price puzzle
also shows up when interest rates are interpreted as indicators of policy stance.
This disappears during the post-reform period when the deposit rate is used as
an indicator of the stance of policy suggesting that the deposit rate may be a
better indicator of BOZ policy than the treasury bill rate. When compared to
the pre-reform period, responses in prices are larger in magnitude while those
of output are not very different.
It has often been said that base money has been very difficult to control in
Zambia. This makes the implementation of the financial programming policy
framework under which monetary policy operates in Zambia difficult. The
significant amount of feedback to the monetary aggregates from the non-policy
variables seen in the estimations suggests further investigation into money
demand in Zambia probably by extending studies such as those of Adam
(1995,1999) to cover periods beyond 1996.
From our results, we conclude that the potency of monetary policy has
increased since the reforms. Although monetary policy in Zambia focuses
almost exclusively on monetary aggregates, we find evidence that exchange
rates may be more important for developments in both prices and output.
Although our results are very plausible, the approach we use in the study
looks at the effect of unexpected policy changes. Despite the likelihood that
the magnitude of this type of shocks is significant in Zambia, further
investigation into the monetary transmission mechanism using other methods
that take into account systematic policy as well would help in showing the
robustness of the results of this study. Testing of the bank lending channel
may also be more usefully done with more disaggregated output and bank
data and this would show a more detailed picture of how monetary policy is
transmitted to the macro-economy.
There are some caveats to bear in mind. Firstly the post-reform period covers
only seven years and may not be enough to capture completely the dynamics
69
in the economy. Secondly, there are still a number of structural changes going
on in the country that are not captured in the method used here that could
have a bearing on the results. However, we believe that the results obtained
here are relevant to policy making and that the study raises important issues
relevant to both policy and research.
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2.8 Appendix A:Impulse Response Functions
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Fig. 2.10: Pre-reform Mechanism One
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Fig. 2.11: Pre-reform Mechanism Two
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Fig. 2.12: Pre-reform Mechanism Three
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Fig. 2.13: Pre-reform Mechanism Four
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2.9 Appendix B: Sources Of Data Variable
Tab. 2.3: Sources of Data
Variable Source
Output World Development indicators 2002, calculated 2001
value based on announced growth rate of 2.2% for that year
CPI Bank Of Zambia Data base and Ministry of Finance and
Economic Development Economic indicators, various years
Monetary aggregates interest rates Bank of Zambia data base and
Bank lending, asset & statutory ratios Annual Reports and Statistics fortnightly
& exchange rates
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3. CAN MONEY TELL US ABOUT INFLATION?
EVALUATING THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF MONEY
FOR PREDICTING INFLATION IN ZAMBIA
ABSTRACT
The paper, investigates whether monetary aggregates have useful information for predicting
inflation other than that provided by inflation itself. We perform forecasting experiments
and compare the performance of different models. We also estimate an error correction
model of inflation. Of the monetary aggregates considered, M2 contains the most
information and its growth rate significant in the inflation model. The external sector
variables are also important. The results indicate that inflation exhibits a high level of
inertia suggesting the presence of implicit indexation and significant inflationary
expectations possibly due to past fiscal effects and low policy credibility. Overall, the foreign
sector variables seem to be more important for movements in prices than monetary
aggregates even in the long run.
Keywords: Information, Monetary Aggregates, Monetary Policy
JEL Classifications: E52, O23, P44.
3.1 Introduction
Implementation of monetary policy in Zambia as in most other African
countries is based on the IMF financial programming framework. Using this
framework implies the assumption that movements in money are informative
for inflation and output and those movements in money precede movements in
prices and output. As such, the Central Bank changes its instruments in line
with deviations of growth in money from target. One of the ways in which the
usefulness of money can be determined is to check how much information is
contained in it for forecasting the subsequent behaviour of inflation and
output.
In chapter II, we found that although money supply explained about 40
percent of variations in inflation, the exchange rate seemed to be more
important for movements in both prices and output. In this chapter, we follow
up on this result and explore the importance of information contained in
money aggregates for movements in prices vis-a´-vis that contained in other
variables such as exchange rates, domestic interest rates, foreign prices and the
government domestic debt. This is a very important issue because for money
aggregates to be used in the conduct of monetary policy in any way, they must
at least contain useful information. Research in both developed and developing
countries has shown that the usefulness of money aggregates in this respect
varies from country to country and period to period. The extensive economic
reforms that have taken place in Zambia since 1992 could have altered the
perceived relationship between inflation and the monetary aggregates.
A few studies have looked at money demand and supply and its relevance to
the price level in Zambia. However the existing information needs to be
updated to incorporate more years in the reform period. Moreover, these
studies have focused mainly on the role played by monetary aggregates.
Besides looking at the monetary aggregates, this study assesses the usefulness
of other financial variables vis-a´-vis the monetary aggregates and try to gauge
which of these variables contains the most information for predicting inflation.
79
This information is crucial not only for day to day conduct of monetary policy
in the current framework but also in the transition to more indirect methods
of policy implementation started in 1993.
The empirical approach used is to conduct forecasting experiments and
estimate an inflation equation. The results show that while M2 contains
information for forecasting inflation, the foreign sector variables may be even
more useful.
The paper is outlined as follows. In section 2 we give a brief background on
inflation and money in Zambia. In Section 3, we discuss the theoretical
framework followed by a review of the literature in Section 4. In Section 5 we
have the methodology and data discussion and in section six the results. We
summarise and conclude in Section 7.
3.2 Monetary Developments and Inflation After the Reforms
For most of the period after independence, Zambian monetary policy relied on
direct instruments with economic growth as the ultimate goal. With increased
dis-intermediation, financial and economic collapse resulting from these
controls and other problems in the country, the central bank switched to
indirect controls in 1992. Interest rates were liberalised, wages and prices
decontrolled, and exchange rates freed. Capital controls were also removed.
Open market operations mainly using liquidity as an instrument were
introduced in 1993 but only in 1995 were daily auctions of credit and deposits
really put in place.
With the switch to indirect instruments came the change of the goal of
monetary policy to the reduction of inflation. This change was prompted by
the belief that monetary policy has only temporal effects on real variables and
long run effects on prices. Empirical evidence over the years has shown that
low inflation is a prerequisite for economic growth. Given the high levels of
inflation in Zambia at the time especially since the reforms, there was need to
bring inflation under control before a sustained path to growth could be
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attained.
Basing implementation of policy on the IMF financial programming
framework, control of growth in money supply became a very important factor
in the control of inflation. Targets are set each year for growth in broad money
and inflation. Implementation of policy has involved monitoring the deviation
of growth in money from target. Controlling the growth of money supply
proved to be a difficult task especially in the years just after financial
deregulation. The almost simultaneous deregulation of both the domestic and
foreign sectors led to problems from different sources .
One such source was the requirement for the Bank of Zambia (BOZ) and the
government to build up international reserves. This was done through the
purchase of foreign exchange off the market. The Bank often reports that such
interventions have lead to increases in money supply. This problem seems to
be more pronounced in years when donor inflows for Balance of Payments
support are erratic. In some cases, BOZ also oﬄoads foreign exchange on the
market in a bid to stabilise the exchange rate. Foreign exchange market
intervention is also common in election years as the government tries to use
the level of the exchange rate as a campaign issue. It is not uncommon to
notice that months preceding an election, the exchange rate holds a given level
for quite some time and shoots up shortly after the elections .
Expansion in net domestic assets (NDA) has also been a major source of
growth in money supply. The main sources of increases in NDA have been net
claims to the government and central bank lending to distressed commercial
banks. In 1997, BOZ moved the location of the clearing house from its
buildings to the commercial banks in an attempt to cut down its lending to
banks. The table below shows growth in money supply and its components. It
is clear that although growth in NDA has been reduced, it is still the largest
contributor to the growth in money and the major contributor amongst the
sub-components is credit to the government.
Inflation was also erratic during this period. The table below shows that
within the sample period (1994-2001), the inflation rate has been above target
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throughout. The most frequently reasons cited for high inflation are currency
depreciation, food prices and fiscal budget performance. Other sources of
inflation cited include banking crises and growth in money supply.
In December 2001, annual inflation was 18.7% almost the same as the sample
period low of 18.6% in 1997. Figure 3.1 shows annual CPI inflation.
Tab. 3.1: % Growth in Broad Money and Its Components
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Growth in M2 101.5 62.8 53.3 34.4 24 22.6 29.2 67.5
Targets 17 19.6 18.2 25.2
NFA -165 -104 -5.7 -43 12.6 -73.3 3.3 -72.3
NDA 266.7 166.9 60.9 77.4 11.4 95.9 25.9 139.8
D/ Credit 43 26.7 5.1 58.4 36 68.3
Govt 1.8 3.9 1.3 48.2 12.3 43.2
Non-govt 41.1 22.8 3.8 10.3 12 3.6
Other Net Items 17.9 50.7 6.3 37.5 -10.1 71.5
Growth in M1 42.3 22.5 24.1 7.7 11.7 4.7 25.5 54.9
Source: Bank Of Zambia and IMF statistics
Tab. 3.2: Target and Actual Inflation rate (1994-2001)
Target Actual Reasons cited
1995 35 45.5 ↑ Banking crises, depreciation, drought
1997 15 18.6 ↓ Good fiscal performance
1998 15 30.6 ↑ Exchange rate depreciation
1999 20 20.6 ↓ Stable exchange rate, reduced food prices (despite increased energy prices)
2000 19 30.1 ↑ Increased Money supply, depreciated exchange rate, increased fuel prices,
electricity tariffs, fall in agricultural prices prevented further increase
2001 17.5 18.7 ↓ stable foreign exchange market
Source: BOZ annual reports Note: Arrows show the direction of movements in annual inflation
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Fig. 3.1: Annual CPI Inflation
3.3 Conceptual Framework
The basis of using money as either an information or intermediate variable is
that there is some reliable relationship between the movements in money and
prices. However, movements in prices may result from movements in other
variables that may contain more information about prices than does money.
Typically, many central banks collect and analyse a number of indicators.
Emphasis placed upon one particular indicator to the exclusion of other
indicators implies that the monetary authority believes that the particular
indicator is the most important for movements in inflation and other variables
do not add any valuable information to the information set.
If we consider a small open economy, we see that factors that affect both
aggregate supply and aggregate demand would affect the price level. For
example, on the one hand increases in money supply, changes in money
demand and increases in government expenditure, which increase aggregate
demand, will cause an increase in prices. On the other hand, supply side
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factors such as technology shocks, changes in capacity utilisation resulting
from restructuring, exchange rates and productivity can also lead to price
changes. With high import dependency, foreign prices can also have a very
significant effect on domestic prices.
The financial programming framework used to implement monetary policy in
Zambia and many other African countries under Structural Adjustment
Program (SAP) however emphasises the role of the growth of money supply.
The reason for this focus is mainly due to the assumption that only growth in
money supply leads to persistent increases in inflation (Romer (1996)). This
assumption rests on the premise that the equation of exchange holds in some
form. Consider the income version of the equation of exchange shown below.
MV ≡ PY (3.1)
Where M is money supply, V velocity, P a price index and Y is real output.
Under classical assumptions, V is assumed to be constant or fixed and Y at
full employment. Expressed in logs, the equation becomes
m+ v ≡ p+ y (3.2)
Under classical assumptions, changes in money balances translate directly into
changes into prices i.e ∆m ≡ ∆p conditional on ∆y and a stable money
velocity. In reality, output is rarely at full employment especially in developing
countries. There are structural rigidities in most of these economies that
inhibit full capacity utilisation of resources and thereby immediate adjustment.
The key to this relationship between money and prices is money demand
which links money to prices, interest rates and output through spending and
saving decisions which individuals make. The amount that is held either as
balances or as deposits depends on amongst other things, the levels of interest
rates, prices, innovations in the banking sector and general economic activity.
Velocity (the frequency at which individuals conduct their transactions)
depends largely on levels of income, changes in prices and innovations in the
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payments system. We have said above that for the supposed relationship to
hold, velocity must be relatively stable. When this is the case, and money
grows faster than output, prices will increase and if money grows very rapidly,
then we have an inflationary situation.
When money demand is unstable, controlling inflation using money supply
becomes very difficult. Factors such as changes in financial regulations,
financial innovations, and changes in portfolio preferences can lead to
instability of money demand. This is very likely to have happened in Zambia
since the reforms.1 A lot of controls that were in place in the financial markets
were removed in the early 1990’s and with increased competition, there has
been a lot of innovation especially in the banking sector. The introduction of
interest earning checking accounts, plastic money and increased access to
consumption loans could very well have changed money demand in the country.
In addition to money supply, other financial variables are monitored by central
banks. This is necessary because policy is forward looking and monetary
policy works with a lag. Since output and inflation are often difficult to
measure at short frequencies, policy makers often have to rely on many
indicators that are closely related to the policy goals. We briefly discuss some
of the variables we think are necessary to the Zambian situation below.
3.3.1 Interest Rates
Many central banks conduct monetary policy by setting or targeting
short-term interest rates. Increases in interest rates usually signal tightening
monetary policy and should slow down inflationary pressures. Once these rates
are set, the market mechanisms then work to determine the detailed structure
of the lending and deposit rates. For this to work, an efficient monetary
transmission mechanism is required. However, interest rates are not always a
clear indication of the stance of monetary policy as they contain information
1 We note here that Adam (1999) finds a stable money demand in Zambia with a portfolio
shift. However, a lot of changes have been implemented since 1996 especially with respect to
the payments system, bank regulation and innovation.
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about both the interest rate and expected inflation.
Due to some of the changes occurring as discussed above, these mechanisms
may not work very well in a developing country like Zambia. One of the
reasons may be changes resulting from the reforms such as the removal of
interest rate controls, which may initially lead to high levels of non-performing
loans, which are compounded by inadequate loan management eroded over
long periods of financial repression. The lack of competition may also lead to
sluggish responses of interest rates to policy changes.
3.3.2 Exchange Rates
The exchange rate can be used as an indicator of inflationary pressures. In
some cases, it is also used as an intermediate target. It reflects both domestic
and foreign pressures. A depreciation is associated with positive inflationary
pressures and affects inflation through the ’aggregate -demand’ and the
’direct exchange rate’ channels.2 When the real exchange rate rises, the
domestic prices of imported and exported final goods increases. The rise in
exportable goods’ prices can be either due to increases in costs of inputs
arising from the depreciation or from increased demand since the depreciation
makes domestic goods cheaper in foreign markets. This results in increased
CPI inflation.
The effect of exchange rates however may be transitory. Factors such as the
degree of openness, domestic capacity utilisation and changes in policy may
also affect the degree of effect exchange rates may have on inflation (Kozicki
(2000)). For example, if the country has capital controls, the effect of
exchange rates on inflation may not be as large as when the capital account is
open since the effect of capital movements (such as predicted by interest
parity) will be absent. However, in some cases, the exchange rate can have
long term effects on inflation. In countries such as Zambia, which had an
overvalued exchange rate for a long time before the reforms and which are still
2 See Svensson (2002)
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heavily import dependent, there is likely to be persistent exchange rate effects
on inflation after the liberalisation of the exchange rate.
3.4 Review Of Literature
3.4.1 Methodological Issues
From the early work of Sims (1972) empirical consideration of whether
financial variables can usefully be employed in conducting monetary policy has
focused not only on the ability of these variables to predict movements in
output and inflation but also on whether they could help predict fluctuations
that are not predictable by information contained in output and inflation
themselves. Empirical work has focused on the use of Vector Auto Regressions
(VARs). The main attraction of tests from VARs is that they provide a
natural basis for testing conditional predictability. As long as the financial
variables contain some information that can independently predict movements
in output or inflation, policy makers can exploit that information (Friedman
and Kuttner (1992).
Many studies have employed Granger-causality tests between financial sector
variables and output or inflation (Friedman and Kuttner (1992), Estrella and
Mishikin (1997), Andersson and Sj (2000). Variance decompositions have been
used to check how much of the forecast error variance in output or inflation is
attributable to a given financial sector variable (Friedman and Kuttner (1992),
Chandra and Tallman (1996), Emery (1996), Andersson and Sj (2000).
Gray and Thoma (1998) have argued that some of the results obtained using
Granger-causality and variance decompositions may be sensitive to changes in
the sample. They may even be heavily influenced by the presence of one
outlier in the data. They suggest the use of recursive regressions such as used
in Emery (1996), which can reveal the sensitivity of the results to changes in
the sample.
VARs have been used to conduct forecasts of output and inflation in systems
that contain a financial sector variable (Chandra and Tallman (1997), Gray
87
and Thoma (1998), Black et al. (2000). Using different measures to compare
the accuracy of the forecasts, the results from different financial variables are
then compared. In this way, the relative importance of different variables is
also checked. Because the ultimate test of an equation lies in its out of sample
tests, many studies have also extended the analysis to compare in sample and
out of sample forecasts while others have used conditional forecasting.
Single equation estimations of output and inflation have also been used to
check the information content of financial variables. If a financial variable
enters the equation significantly, then it contains useful information for policy
(Chandra and Tallman (1997)). Numerous studies of inflation have also been
done without particular reference to the issue of information content of the
financial variables. However, almost all these studies include some financial
sector variables like exchange rates and interest rates as explanatory variables
so that if these variables enter these equations significantly, they can be said to
contain some inflation information.
3.4.2 Empirical Review
A number of studies looking at the information content of monetary
aggregates for inflation and output have been carried out. The studies we
could access however are mainly on developed countries. However, many
inflation studies on developing countries in general and Africa specifically
although not focusing on monetary aggregates per se, have included money
aggregates,exchange rates and interest rate measures as explanatory variables.
These can give us an indication of the importance of these variables for
inflation.3 We will therefore review a few studies specific to the topic and then
some inflation studies on African countries.
A number of studies have employed the VAR methodology. By evaluating F-
statistics and forecast performance measures, empirical work has shown that
the issue of whether monetary aggregates are important for inflation or not
3 This is with the caveat that most of these studies use samples across different policy
regimes and therefore are subject to the Lucas critique.
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varies from country to country and from one period to another.
One of the studies important to the discussion here using US data is that by
Friedman and Kuttner (1992). They use F- statistics to determine the
importance of money variables in a VAR model. They find that both M1 and
M2 are significant for inflation before 1980 and the significance disappears
when the data set is extended beyond that period. Of particular interest, they
find that the commercial paper bill spread was a good information candidate
for industrial production. This conclusion sparked a debate and some of the
resulting papers are those of Emery (1996) who estimates recursive regressions
and uses both Granger-causality and variance decompositions. He attributes
the importance of this variable to the presence of outliers in the data. Hafer
and Kutan (1997) explore the importance of the commercial bill spread and
argue that the conclusion on its significance was a result of wrong stationarity
assumptions about the money variables. He finds that by carefully modelling
the data, money variables are still useful beyond the 1980s. Black et al. (2000)
perform forecasts of inflation and output using the same data. They estimate
an AR (1) model as a base model and calculate its mean absolute percentage
error. They then forecast inflation adding one variable at a time to the AR (1)
model and compare the MAPEs of the different models. They find that money
improves the forecasts of inflation.
Studies testing the importance of monetary aggregates have also been carried
out using Australian data. One such study is that by Orden and Fisher (1993).
They obtain variance decompositions and find that money shocks contributed
up to 30% in variations of prices. Chandra and Tallman (1996) also use the
VAR approach on Australian data. However, unlike in the Orden and Fisher
(1993) study that measured inflation using the GDP deflator, they use the CPI
to measure the price level. They also extend the sample period to cover the
period after financial deregulation. They find that although M3 is important in
some systems in the block exogeneity tests, it is not significant as an inflation
predictor in any of the specifications. M2 is significant in exogeneity tests only
towards the end of the sample but has no predictive importance either.
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Some studies use single equation estimations of inflation to check the
importance of money aggregates to inflation. One such study is Chandra and
Tallman (1997)’s extension of their 1996 study. Using the 5% significance level
as their decision rule, they find that only M3 is important to inflation. This
agrees with the exogeneity test results in their 1996 study.
A number of inflation studies have been carried out with data from different
African countries. The results obtained seem to be similar in most of these
studies. Whereas in a few cases monetary aggregates are important for
movements in prices, other variables such as the exchange rate, foreign prices
and interest rate measures seem to be more significant in explaining
movements in inflation.
Durevall and Ndung’u (2001) estimated a dynamic error correction model of
inflation for Kenya covering the period 1974 to 1996. They find that money
supply affects prices only in the short run. The excess money demand error
correction term is not significant at any conventional levels. However they find
a significant role for the three-month treasury bill rate. In a study of the
monetary transmission mechanism in Uganda, Nachenga (2001) also finds a
highly significant role for the treasury bill rate. He also finds that the first lag
of growth in money supply is significant.
Sacerdoti and Xiao (2001) estimate a similar model for Madagascar covering
the period 1971 to 2000. They also find that the money variable is insignificant
at all conventional levels. They find a very significant role for the exchange
rate. Similarly, Durevall and kadenge (2001) find that after the reforms,
money supply ceases to be an important determinant of inflation in Zimbabwe.
Instead, the exchange rate and foreign prices become more important.
Two studies of inflation in Zambia were accessible. The first one is by Mwansa
(1998) who estimates both an error correction and VAR model of inflation.
Using quarterly data for the period 1985 to 1996, he finds that the second lag
of M1 is marginally significant for inflation. In the VAR model, he finds that
shocks to M1 explain 15% of the variations in inflation after 1 year while
shocks to the exchange rate explain as much as 22% of inflation variations
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after 6 months.
The second study is by Andersson and Sj (2000) and is more directly related
to the discussion in this paper. Using single equation and multivariate
causality tests, they analyse the relationship between money and inflation.
The study covers the period 1987 to 1993 in which the first attempt at
monetary policy reforms were being made. Using an error correction term,
they test for Granger-causality between money and prices and find that money
predicts prices. In the multivariate results, they find that the price level is
Granger caused by a combination of money supply and the exchange rate.
The current study differs from these two studies in two main aspects. Firstly,
we incorporate a broader number of variables in the study. We not only look
at the ability of money to predict prices, but we explicitly compare the
performance of the monetary aggregates to that of other variables such as
interest rates and government debt. Secondly, the study covers a longer period
in the reform period and does not incorporate any years in the pre-reform
period thereby avoiding the problem of fundamental structural shifts.
3.5 Empirical Methodology
In the estimations, we begin by conducting forecasting experiments. This is
used as an alternative to Granger-causality tests to check for the information
content in a variable that can be used to forecast inflation.Although
Granger-causality provides information about whether a variable contains
information useful for predicting prices, it is not sufficient for forecastability
(Clements and Hendry (1999)). To be able to say more about whether a
variable contains information that is useful to policy makers in forecasting
future values of inflation, we conduct out-of-sample forecasts. The forecasts for
the different variables are evaluated using the mean absolute percentage error
(MAPE) which allows us to compare the performance of different information
variables. We consider an autoregressive (AR) model as a base model and use
it to forecast inflation. We then estimate a conditional model, which includes
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inflation and a financial variable one at a time. We also use this conditional
model to forecast inflation. If this model produces a MAPE lower than that of
the AR model, such a model is said to contain useful information for
forecasting inflation.
We will also estimate an inflation model to determine whether money supply
enters the inflation equation significantly when we condition on more
information. We conclude that money has important information for inflation
if any of the money lags are significant at most at 5%. Using both the VAR
analysis and a single equation analysis acts as a robustness check. This is
important for this study, as we do not have access to similar studies against
which we can compare our results.
3.5.1 Auto Regressive Analysis
The models estimated take the form shown in the equation below.
pt = α+
n∑
i=0
βpt−i +
n∑
i=0
φxt−i + εt (3.3)
pt is the price level measured by the CPI and xt is the variable used in
addition to price in the model. β and φ are constant parameters. ε is the error
term and t the time subscript. The number of lags is selected such that we use
the lowest number of lags that eliminate residual autocorrelation in the
regression model.
For forecasting, we define MAPE below for periods 1 to N of a single series
where N is the number of observations. We start by obtaining the forecast
error for a single period εt where ε is the error and t is a time subscript. Then,
εt = pt − pˆt (3.4)
where pˆ is the price level forecast
The percentage error (PE) then is
PE =
pt − pˆt
pt
x100 (3.5)
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so that the absolute percentage error for period t is
APE =| pt − pˆt
pt
x100 | (3.6)
and the MAPE
MAPE =
N∑
t=1
APE
N
(3.7)
The MAPE has been said to be asymmetric in that it treats over estimations
and underestimations differently. However, it still remains one of the most
widely used and reliable measure of forecast performance and so we proceed to
use it here (See Meade (2000), Goodwin and Lawton (1999), and Willemain
(1991) for discussions of the MAPE). The MAPE was found to be a more
suitable measure than the mean square error(MSE) and the mean absolute
error(MAE), which are not directly comparable across estimation periods and
models (Makridakis et al. (1998).
3.5.2 Single Equation Estimation
For the period under study, Zambia is assumed to be a small open economy.
Although most studies of inflation in Africa recognise the fact that inflation is
driven by a combination of factors falling across different theoretical
assumptions, most recent studies focus on money demand and the external
sector either through the PPP relationship or through the PPP and UIP
relationships. In this study, we take a more general approach as in Metin
(1995) and Hendry (2001) and incorporate a wider number of factors in the
estimation. We postulate different possible relationships between inflation and
different factors and we discuss them each in turn below.
Money Sector
We begin by looking at the role of money creation where inflation can be
produced by a rapid increase in the quantity of money supply relative to
output (see Friedman and Scwartz (1982)). The starting point is the money
demand function. In line with the general literature, we assume that demand
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for money is primarily a demand for real balances. In the absence of money
illusion, an increase in the level of prices induces an increase in the demand for
nominal balances leaving the level of real balances the same so that we can say
that in equilibrium, individuals hold nominal balances in proportion to their
nominal income.
We assume that money demand is a function of transactions and asset
motives. To keep the level of transactions the same, economic agents adjust
their demand for nominal balances as prices change. Changes in the interest
rate also induce changes in the amount of balances held as they affect the
relative price of alternative uses of wealth. In an economy with no capital
controls, changes in foreign interest rates and exchange rates also affect the
amount of money held in the economy because alternative investment
opportunities arise for domestic economic agents in foreign capital markets.
To capture these motives, we assume that money demand is a function of
income (y), money’s own rate of return (idep) and the opportunity cost of
holding money (itbill) and depreciation of the exchange rate (∆e).
Since economic agents hold money in proportion to nominal income in
equilibrium, inflation in the money market is generated by deviations from this
equilibrium. Equilibrium in the money market requires that money supply
(Ms) be equal to money demand (Md). Let P be the price level so that our
money demand equation can be written as in equation ( 3.8).
Ms
P
=Md(y,∆e, idep, itbill) (3.8)
The relationship between money and the variables is such that:
δMs
δY > 0,
δMs
δidep
> 0, δM
s
δitbill
< 0, δM
s
δ∆e < 0,
Foreign Sector
We also look at the role of foreign prices in determining domestic prices.
Although asset markets can also play an important role in determining the
exchange rate and therefore affect domestic prices, we assume away such a
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view in this study. This stance is justified because although the capital
account was open almost throughout the sample period, high transactions
costs and underdeveloped financial asset markets imply that the role played by
capital movements and hence foreign interest rates was very minimal. In the
study we therefore postulate a simple PPP theory. Tests indicate that there is
a stable exchange rate with a trend stationary real exchange rate.4 Therefore,
the real exchange rate is assumed constant in equilibrium so that
p = e+ p∗ (3.9)
where p, p∗ and e are logs of the domestic price, the foreign price and the
exchange rate respectively. The source of inflation in this relationship is the
deviations from this equilibrium.
Excess Demand
Here we look at the role of excess demand for real goods in determining
inflation. Theory suggests that excess demand for final goods leads to inflation
as increased demand above supply bids prices upwards. This has been
measured in the literature as a deviation of output from its natural rate or
from trend. Empirical approaches include calculating some measure of
potential capacity as in Hendry (2001) or using deviations of output from
trend as in Metin (1995). Availability of data leads us to adopt the later
approach in the study. Production and other structural rigidities may cause
demand to be in excess of supply which could be inflationary enabling the
analysis of these excess demand situations. One particular case for Zambia is
that of excess maize demand in times of drought. Maize is the staple food
almost all over the country and excess demand tends to drive maize prices up
quite significantly in times of drought. Unfortunately we did not have access to
monthly data for the whole sample period that would allow us to specifically
check the importance of maize demand in determining the price level.
4 see section 6.2.1
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Public Sector
We also wish to incorporate the role played by fiscal policy in propagating
inflation. Since it was not possible to obtain consistent data on the
government deficit, we use total government domestic debt as the fiscal
measure. The role of labour costs, wages and unemployment is also important
in determining inflation. However, we are unable to test this relationship due
to the absence of relevant data.
3.5.3 Data
Time Series Characteristics
In this section we discuss the data used in the estimations. The data used are
monthly for the period January 1994 to December 2001. The sources for each
series are indicated in appendix C. Alongside the graphs, we discuss what
order of integration each series exhibits. Table (3.3) shows the unit root tests
for the variables used. All the data in the table are in log levels. In checking
for the unit root, we used the Philips-Perron tests . The Phillips-Perron test
may be more appropriate as it is a generalisation of the ADF test and is less
restrictive on its assumptions about the residuals 5
Output and prices are plotted in figure 3.2. Output is measured by real GDP
interpolated from an annual to a monthly series using the Denton method.6
The unit root test shows that this series is trend stationary. We use this
variable only in the fully specified inflation equation model. The price level is
measured by the composite consumer price index (CPI). We plot this series
5 This is a method developed by Phillips and Perron (1988) and is a generalisation of
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The assumptions about error properties are less
stringent than in the ADF method. The null hypothesis is that ρ = 1 in the equation
∆y = µ+ ρyt−1 + ε
6 The Denton Method for interpolating data uses an ’associated series’ imposing the con-
straint that the interpolated series must obey the annual totals. The indicator series con-
tributes its pattern to the series and adds more information especially where such movements
in such a series are closely related to the series to be interpolated. See Renka (1988) and
Baum (2001)
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Tab. 3.3: Unit Root Tests
Variable levels 1st difference Integration order
m2 -2.92 -12.97** I(1)
m1 -1.58 -10.96* I(1)
p 2.267 -6.45** I(1)
y -4.223** I(0)
idep -0.45 -6.667** I(1)
itbill -2.69 -5.193** I(1)
ibond -4.355** I(0)
deficit -1.799 -12.67** I(1)
P*ssa -1.43 -7.76** I(1)
P*usa -3.23 9.082** I(1)
erand -1.593 -7.73** I(1)
edollar -3.23 -8.01** I(1)
debt -1.239 -8.962** I(1)
*(**) significant at (5%),(1%) levels of significance
Tests were obtained using the Phillips Perron method
and its first difference (monthly inflation) in the upper panel of figure 2. For
most of the sample period, inflation has been fairly stable. Large fluctuations
are observed in the early part of the sample, which are the early years after
the reforms, and periods of very high inflation.
M1 and M2 are used in the estimation alternately. In Figure 3.3 we plot the
log levels in the upper panel, monthly growth in the middle panel and the real
series ( deflated by the CPI) in the lower panel. The real series are mean
adjusted. The Phillips-Peron tests show that the series exhibit a unit root in
nominal terms. The series are however stationary in first differences.
We use three interest rates in the study and these are plotted in figure 3.4 The
three-month treasury bill rate is used as the alternate interest rate, the
average deposit rate as the own interest rate and the 12-month bond rate as
the long rate. The 12-month bond was the longest period bond available for
most of the sample period. The three interest rates are quite highly correlated
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Fig. 3.2: Prices and Output
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Fig. 3.3: Monetary Aggregates
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early in the sample until mid-1996 when the bond rate sharply declines for a
few months and begins to increase again. The deposit rate begins to decline in
late 1997 and the spread from the treasury bill rate continues to widen for the
rest of the sample period. The unit root tests show that the deposit and bond
rates are stationary although there is a possible structural break in early 1998.
We redo the test starting December 1994 and the deposit rate is now I(1). The
statistic reported in the table reflects the later.
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Fig. 3.4: Interest Rates
The nominal exchange rate is measured by the rate of the kwacha to the rand
and the kwacha to the dollar. These rates are used alternately in the
estimations. For the foreign prices, we use the South African CPI (p∗ssa) and
the US wholesale price index (p∗usa). The South African variables were chosen
because South Africa is Zambia’s major trading partner especially in consumer
goods and it was thought an appropriate alternative to averaging over major
trading partners . The use of the US variables is motivated by the fact that
most official transactions are conducted using the US dollar. We plot these
variables in figure 3.5 below. We also plot in the bottom panel the real
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exchange rates for both the dollar and the rand defined as the log of the
domestic price minus the log of the foreign price and log of the relevant
exchange rate. The exchange rate has been increasing over time although a
short period of decline is observed shortly before the 2001 elections. The
prices and nominal exchange rates have a unit root and stationary in first
differences. The dollar real rate is stationary while that of the rand is not.
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Fig. 3.5: Foreign Prices and Exchange Rates
We also use domestic debt as measured by government securities outstanding
(treasury bills plus government bonds)as a fiscal measure. The series and its
growth rates are plotted in figure 3.6 below. The variables in levels move
together until 1998 when domestic debt shows a downward trend but begins to
rise again after 2000. The growth series exhibit a lot of volatility for both
variables.
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Fig. 3.6: Domestic Debt
3.6 Estimation Results
We begin our discussion of the results with the forecasting experiments and
then move on to discuss the estimation of the inflation equation. All
estimations that involve the interest rates are done from December 1994 to
avoid the possible structural break. We include seasonal dummies in both the
forecasting and single equation estimations. In the forecasting experiments, we
explore the information content of the financial variables by looking at the
relationships between prices and different possible information variables.
These forecasting experiments are done in an auto regression setting as shown
in equation ( 3.3). In the inflation equation, our interest is to see if the
financial variables and in particular the monetary aggregates enter the
inflation equation significantly. This is particularly important in that it allows
us to check the performance of the variables when we control for the presence
of other variables. It has often been argued that when interest rates are added,
money tends to loose its explanatory power.
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3.6.1 Forecasting
In this section, we discuss the forecasting experiments. The forecasts are all
out of sample forecasts.The focus on out of sample forecasting experiments is
an attempt to simulate real time policy decision making. Since the data used
are revised, the type of information available to us differs from that available
to the decision maker at the central bank. Each model is composed of the
price level and one possible information variable. Each forecast is a one step
ahead forecast over a moving window of four years. One step ahead forecasts
were preferred as a way of mimicking the horizon the central bank faces given
the data. The initial estimation is done between January 1994 and December
1997. We then make a forecast for January 1998. Then the estimation sample
is rolled over to start February 1994 and end January 1998 and then we make
a forecast for February 1998 and so on.
We then calculate the MAPE based on ( 3.7) to decide if a variable adds
significant information for forecasting or not. This decision is based on the
relative performance of a benchmark model. The benchmark model used is the
best fitted autoregressive model for the price level. Preliminary analysis
showed that the best fit model was an AR(1) model and this can be seen from
Figure 3.10 in the appendix which shows the correlation function for the price
level . We therefore estimate an AR(1) model as the base model. This model
is also estimated using rolling regressions over the same moving window. The
higher the MAPE for a model relative to the benchmark model, the less
information the additional variable has for forecasting inflation. This approach
is superior to just looking at the performance of one model for our interest
because it allows us to compare ’competing’ information variables. More
importantly, we can check the importance of the information from the
monetary aggregates relative to information from other variables by comparing
their MAPEs.
The data are used in log levels. The use of rolling regression precludes the use
of co-integration in this analysis as co-integration was only identified at a few
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Tab. 3.4: Mean Absolute Percentage Errors (1998-2001)
Out of samplea
AR(1) 0.16
M1 0.115
M2 0.112
Rand exchange rate 0.104
Dollar exchange rate 0.099
Treasury bill rate 0.117
Deposit rate 0.106
Domestic debt 0.106
aThe out of sample forecasts are one step ahead forecasts with the model estimated
between January 1994 and December 1997 and then forecast for the period 1998 to 2001.
horizons for most sets of variables. Forecasting with non-stationary variables
produces forecast errors of similar forms as in stable cases (Luketpol (1993)).
The method used to evaluate the forecasts does not suffer from the
disadvantages of say the Mean Square Error (MSE) where the error grows
with the forecast horizon.
After obtaining the forecasts, we compute the percentage error for each period.
We then use these to calculate three types of MAPEs. The first is a MAPE for
the entire period. Each MAPE calculated here shows the accuracy of the
model over the entire forecast horizon. We show the results in table (3.4).
From the table we see that the MAPEs for all the variables are less than that
of the benchmark AR(1) model. Using our decision rule, we can say that these
variables have important information for forecasting inflation over the sample
period. We can also say that the most important variables are the exchange
rates since they have the lowest MAPEs. Conversely, the least important
variables are the treasury bill rate and M1.
To see more clearly the performance evolution over the sample period of the
different variables in forecasting inflation, we calculate two other types of
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means. The first is a 12-month moving average of the percentage errors and a
second - a cumulative mean where a mean of the percentage errors was
obtained by adding one period at a time and obtaining a mean until the whole
forecast horizon was covered. The results give us a time moving view of how
important each variable is for forecasting inflation.
The 12-month moving averages measure the accuracy of the model in
forecasting inflation for the 12 months prior to time t. For example, if we take
the first observation in the AR(1) model with a MAPE of 0.2%, we can say
that using the AR(1) model to forecast inflation between December 1997 and
December 1998, we would have been within 0.2% of the actual value and
0.21% of the value between January 1998 and January 1999 and so on. We
graphed the obtained MAPEs in figure ( 3.7) below. To make it easier to read
the graphs, we graph them in two panels so that the top panel shows results
for the money aggregates and the exchange rates while the lower panel shows
the interest rates and the government domestic debt. A graph that shows all
the MAPEs in one figure is shown in the appendix.
All the variables’ MAPEs lie well below those of the AR(1) model through the
whole sample period. The variables with the smallest MAPEs are the
exchange rates the deposit rate and domestic debt. The M2 MAPEs are also
quite low especially towards the end of the sample although they increase
slightly in 2001. The variable with the largest MAPEs is the treasury bill rate.
M1 does not perform very well through most of the horizon and the MAPEs of
the dollar exchange rate rise in the later part of the sample.
The cumulative MAPEs are shown in figure ( 3.8). These graphs show a more
long-term view of the performance of the information variables in predicting
inflation. Again the top panel consist of the money variables and the exchange
rates while the bottom panel consist of the interest rates and the domestic
debt MAPEs. Apart from M1 which exceeds the AR(1) MAPES for a brief
moment, all the MAPES lie below those of the benchmark model.The
exchange rates, the deposit rate and domestic debt seem to provide the most
useful information for predicting inflation while both the money aggregates
104
1999 2000 2001 2002
0.10
0.15
0.20
M2 
Rand Exchange rate 
A(1) 
M1 
Dollar Exchnage Rate 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002
0.10
0.15
0.20
Deposit Rate 
Domestic Debt 
Treasury Bill Rate 
A(1) 
Fig. 3.7: 12-Month Moving MAPES
and the treasury bill rate are not as important.
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Fig. 3.8: Cumulative MAPEs
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The forecasting experiments that we conduct in this section show that over
the whole sample period most of the variables examined serve as important
information variables for price movements. When both long run and short run
horizon experiments are considered, we find that the foreign exchange rates,
the deposit rate and the domestic debt provide the most information about
price movements.
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3.6.2 Inflation Equation
In this section, we extend the above analysis and consider how the discussed
variables perform in the presence of other control variables and whether these
variables have a causal effect on inflation. To do this, we estimate a fully
specified inflation equation. We start by looking at the co-integration
relationships discussed in section 5.2. We then report the estimation of the
error correction inflation model estimated.
Co-integration Analysis
We tested for co-integration in the monetary and foreign sectors using the
Johansen procedure. We identified co-integrating relationships in both sectors
and we outline the identified relationships below. The full co-integration test
results and the weak exogeneity test results are in appendix B.
In the monetary sector, the analysis for M1 showed that this relationship was
unstable. The M2 relationship is shown in equation 3.10
ecm2 = (m− p)− 1.2y − 0.016itbill + 0.01idep (3.10)
We imposed homogeneity by restricting the coefficient on y to -1 and it was
accepted at χ2(1) = 0.15(0.698). With this restriction, the relationship is
shown below.
ecm2 = (m− p)− y − 0.015itbill + 0.01idep (3.11)
The signs on the interest rates are unexpected. The treasury bill rate is
positively related to real money demand probably because it is like a
maximum deposit rate. Adam (1992) interprets it as the own rate of return on
money in the long run and this could explain the positive sign.
We also found co-integration in the external sector using both dollar and rand
exchange rates although these relationships hold only in the presence of a time
trend. The trend could explain the long-run evolution of the real exchange
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rate that may be due to changes in terms of trade, reforms or changes in
productivity growth.
ecpd = p− 0.744e− 0.007p ∗usa −0.004trend (3.12)
ecpr = p− 0.924e− 0.05p ∗ssa −0.008trend (3.13)
The coefficient on the foreign price in both relationships is rather small. We
imposed the PPP restriction by setting the e and p* prices to -1. Both
restrictions were accepted conditional upon including a trend and we have the
following relationships
ecpd = p− e− p ∗usa −0.024trend (3.14)
ecpr = p− e− p ∗ssa −0.026trend (3.15)
The inflation equation we estimate includes the disequilibrium relations
estimated. We also regress nominal income on a constant and a trend and use
the residuals as a measure of excess demand. The other variables enter the
equation in first differences as a measure of the short run effect of these
variables on inflation. We will estimate an equation of the form
∆p = a0 +
∑
aiyt−i +
∑
bi∆mt−i +
∑
ciidept−i +
∑
fiitbillt−i +
∑
gi∆pt−i
+
∑
ji∆et−i +
∑
li∆debtt−i +
∑
ηibondt−i + ecmt−1 + ecpt−1 + ut
where ecm and ecp are the money and external sectors’ error correction terms.
Error Correction Model of Inflation
In this section, we discuss the estimation of an error correction model of
inflation. Despite that our interest in the paper is to look at the role of
financial sector variables, the estimation of a fully specified inflation equation
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allows us to check how the variables of interest perform in the presence of
other control variables. In estimating the equation, we included 4 lags on each
variable and searched for a parsimonious model by sequentially dropping the
insignificant lags until only significant variables were left.
We estimated the equation with M1 and M2 alternately as monetary
aggregates and the rand and dollar exchange rates alternately with each
monetary aggregate. M1 is only significant in the equation where the dollar is
used as the exchange rate but it has the wrong sign. We therefore report only
the results in which M2 was used here and show the results with M1 as the
monetary aggregate in the appendix B. The results of the parsimonious model
with M2 are shown in table ( 3.5). The reduction statistics are shown at the
bottom of the table.
The diagnostic tests are also shown at the bottom of the table and the
recursive coefficients and statistics are shown in appendix B. All the tests
show that the models are well specified. There is no evidence of residual
autocorrelation according to the AR tests, no ARCH indications or presence of
heteroskedasticity (hetero test). The errors appear normal and the regression
equations are well specified according to the normality and RESET tests.
Most of the variables have the expected signs and the recursive coefficients and
statistics show stability in the parameters.
Of the variables of interest, we find that M2 is important. The third lag of the
growth rate of M2 is significant in both equations and is correctly signed. The
error correction term however is insignificant. The net effect of M2 on inflation
in both equations is about 8-9%. The external sector variables are significant.
The error correction terms based on both exchange rates enter the inflation
equation and are significant at the 1% level suggesting a significant long run
relationship between Zambian prices and foreign prices. The contemporaneous
value of the dollar depreciation rate is also significant at 1% and is correctly
signed. The magnitude of the error correction term on the rand is very close
and in some cases exactly the same as those obtained in other studies on
African countries (see Durevall and Ndung’u (2001), Sacerdoti and Xiao
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Tab. 3.5: Error Correction Model of Inflation With M2 1994:1 To 2001:12
rand Dollar
coefficient t-value p-value coefficient t-value p-value
Constant 0.001 0.196 0.846 0.005 1.16 0.25
∆pt−1 0.4 4.77 0.000 0.4 4.72 0.000
∆pt−3 0.19 2.02 0.047
∆(m− p)t−3 0.094 3.44 0.001 0.08 2.66 0.01
∆et 0.06 2.42 0.018
∆debt 0.04 2.49 0.015 0.032 2.12 0.038
∆itbillt−1 0.001 2.13 0.036
∆idept−2 -0.002 -2.45 0.017 -0.002 -3.88 0.000
ibond 0.008 2.92 0.005
ibondt−1 -0.0006 -2.30 0.025
ibondt−3 -0.0007 -2.86 0.005 -0.001 -4.83 0.000
ibondt−4 0.0006 2.50 0.015
ecpt−1 -0.04 -3.15 0.002 -0.12 -5.06 0.000
diagnostic tests
AR(1− 4)a F(4,71) 0.886(0.477) F(4,73) 1.36(0.242)
ARCH4b F(4,67) 0.548(0.70) F(4,67) 0.669(0.675)
Normalityc c2(2) 3.96(0.138) c2(2) 5.69(0.06)
Heterod F(24,54) 1.162(0.319) F(18,60) 0.822(0.668)
RESET e F(1,74) 0.47 (0.495) F (1,76) 2.923(0.0913)
R2 0.60 0.60
∗∗ denotes significance at the 1% and 5% levels
aThe AR(1-4) test is an LM test for 4th order residual autocorrelation calculated according to Harvey (1981)
bARCH tests the presence of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity Engle (1982)
c Normality test based on Doornik and Hansen (1994) with a small sample correction
d Based on White(1980), the test checks for unconditional heteroskedasticity
eThe RESET test due to Ramsey(1969), tests the null of correct model specification
The unrestricted model yielded s=1.07% for 59 variables (SC=-4.359) with the rand
and s=0.8% for 59 variables (SC=-4.927) with the dollar
The Parsimonious model yielded s=1.09%, for 15 variables (SC=-5.63) with the rand
and s=1.06% for 11 variables (SC=-5.836) with the dollar
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(2001)).
The coefficient on the first lag of inflation is significant at the one percent level
with about 40% of previous period inflation feeding into current inflation. This
result is quite similar to results obtained in other studies for African countries
. The interest rates are significant but the treasury bill rate is positively
signed. The studies by Durevall and Ndung’u (2001) and Nachenga (2001) also
find a positive coefficient on the treasury bill rate. The contemporaneous effect
of the growth rate in domestic debt is significant in both equations and is
correctly signed.
3.7 Does Money Tell Us Anything About Inflation In Zambia?
We have in section six examined the usefulness of various variables in
forecasting inflation. If a conditional model has MAPEs lower than those of
the base model, we can argue that the variable in such a model is useful for
forecasting inflation. This is particularly important with the out of sample
forecasts. We can also say that the model with the least MAPE has more
information for forecasting inflation than the other models. The full inflation
equation results augment this analysis by checking the performance of the
variable conditioning on the presence of other variables in the equation. If a
variable performs well in most of the above analysis, we conclude that such a
variable does have something to say about movements in inflation.
We find that the monetary aggregates have predictive power through most of
the sample period. Although M2 MAPEs do not exceed those of the
benchmark model the variable does not perform well relative to other variables
such as the foreign exchange rates, the deposit interest rate and domestic debt.
From the single equation estimations, we find that a growth of 1% in M2
predicts a 0.9% increase in inflation after three months. We find evidence of
some synergy between M2 and the dollar exchange rate. The short run effect
of the exchange rate is only significant when the dollar is used as the exchange
rate. This result is very similar to that obtained by Andersson and Sj (2000).
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They find that they can only establish a link between money growth and
inflation in a co-integrating VAR model only if the dollar exchange rate is part
of the system. This result shows that analysing monetary policy independent
of the foreign sector in Zambia may be misleading.
M1 does not perform well in forecasting through most of the forecasting
horizon. In the single equation estimation, the variable is not significant. The
difference between M1 and M2 in Zambia is time and savings deposits. One of
the likely reasons for this that it is time and savings deposits that banks
convert into loans. Since this is the vehicle through which money supply is
more likely to affect inflation, we expect that a high deposit to loan ratio
would be evidence of a significant effect of time and savings deposits on
inflation. Figure 3.9 below shows that the ratio has been quite high during the
estimation period falling below 60% only once in 1997.
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Fig. 3.9: Deposit -Credit Ratio
The deposit rate however has been declining significantly since 1995.7 The
spread between market rates such as the 3-month treasury bill rate and the
7 see figure 3.4
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deposit rate has increased over the years. It is unlikely therefore that interest
rates are the driving force behind the observed increase in time and savings
deposits. The more likely reason for this increased demand is innovations in
the banking sector. The array of portfolio choices available to the public has
increased. A number of banks have also introduced personal and other loans
related to time deposit holdings as collateral.
The exchange rates perform fairly well in both the forecasting and single
equation results. The dollar MAPEs rise in mid 1999 to early 2000 but fall
quite significantly towards the end of the sample. One possible explanation for
this is near dollarisation of the economy from about early 1999. A number of
domestic transactions were denominated in dollars. Some foreign owned
cellular mobile companies opened and demanded that payments be made in
dollars. This practice spread to real estates where many real estate owners
demanded payment in dollars for rent of property.8 Over the same period, the
government owned mining company Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines
(ZCCM), which was one of the major foreign exchange earners, was privatised.
The level of total reserves also declined by more than half over this period
from $103 million at the end of 1999 to just $45 million by mid 2000 when it
began to steadily increase again. By Mid June 2000, the central bank began to
counter the effects of increased dollar demand by increasing foreign exchange
market intervention. All these factors could account for the observed behaviour
in the dollar as such changes can lead to increase in exchange rate volatility.
In the inflation equation, both the long and short run terms of the dollar
exchange rate are significant at the 1% level. The error correction terms
indicates a 12% disequilibrium correction each period. A significant long run
relationship between the domestic and South African prices is established.
The coefficient on the rand error correction term indicates a 4% disequilibrium
correction each period.
8 It is now illegal to make such payments using any currency other than the kwacha. A law
has now been passed in Zambia that only non-Zambian citizens should pay for transactions
in foreign exchange
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The forecasting results show that the MAPEs of the treasury bill rate are
amongst the highest. The MAPEs of the deposit rate are low in most horizons
and in fact at the end of the sample, the deposit rate is one of the best
performing variables. The results from the error correction model show that
this variable is significant but with very small coefficients. The results as a
whole show that while the deposit rate may not contain a lot of information, it
could perform well as a leading indicator. The government debt variable
performs well over most of the forecasting horizons and even better than M2.
In the single equation results, it has a 4% contemporaneous effect.
Inflation exhibits a high level of inertia with over 30% of previous period
inflation feeding into current period inflation. A number of reasons could
account for this amongst which is fiscal dominance. If the conduct of domestic
monetary policy is dictated or constrained by fiscal demands, the country
becomes vulnerable to inflationary pressures of a fiscal nature. Where this is
not checked, it induces the creation of formal and informal indexation
mechanism, which can lead to inflation persistence. Widespread formal
indexation is absent in Zambia, but informal indexation is likely to exist.
Wage and salary negotiations are infrequent in the public sector, which is still
the largest employer in the country. In the private sector, Trade Unions
negotiate for wage increases almost every year, which in a way provides an
implicit wage indexation. One way of reducing these fiscal effects is to increase
central bank independence. Provisions in the Bank Of Zambia Act (1996) give
the Minister of Finance powers over the conditions of service of the governor
and powers to give directives to the Central Bank. These provisions
compromise central bank independence and my need to be modified to give
the central bank more autonomy.
Another reason could be poor initial policy credibility, which can lead to high
levels of inflationary expectations resulting from long periods of high inflation.
Prior to 1991, the Zambian government had a history of backtracking on
reforms. This could have created a situation where the public has no
confidence in the government and policy announcements cannot influence
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public expectations. If this is the case, BOZ may need to address the issue of
policy transparency. Transparency tends to lower inflationary expectations by
providing an implicit commitment mechanism on the part of the central bank
( Svensson, 1998). This way policy becomes more credible and the public can
form expectations that are closer to the policy targets. Since the 2002 fiscal
year, policy targets are announced to the public. If these targets are actually
realised, this could help restore public confidence in policy announcements.
Unfortunately, statistics show that both the money growth and inflation
targets were not met in the fiscal year 2001/2002.
The results as a whole show that while the monetary aggregates, especially M2
contain useful information about inflation movements, the external sector
variables may be even more useful in predicting inflation movements in
Zambia.
3.8 Summary and Conclusion
In the paper, we have sought to establish whether monetary aggregates have
useful information for forecasting inflation other than that provided by
inflation itself. We have approached the problem in two ways. First we
conduct forecasting experiments and using moving averages calculate mean
absolute percentage errors. We then evaluate whether each monetary variable
improves the forecasts of a simple AR(1) model of inflation. We find that M2
performs better than M1 but not as well as the exchange rates or the domestic
debt.
We also estimate an inflation equation and determine alternately whether M1
and M2 enter the equation significantly. We find that M1 is not significant
while M2 is significant. We also find evidence of synergy between the monetary
aggregates and the dollar exchange rate. Only the foreign sector long run term
is significant. The second lag of the deposit interest rate and the
contemporaneous value of the domestic debt are significant in the model. The
results obtained are robust across the two methods used and we conclude that
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although the monetary variables contain some information about inflation,
foreign sector variables may be more useful in predicting inflation in Zambia.
We suggest that monetary policy be more transparent to address the issue of
expectations as inflation exhibits a high degree of inertia. There is also need to
increase central bank independence so as to reduce the effect of fiscal pressure
on monetary policy. A closer look at the role of other factors such as
fluctuations in food production and the informal sector (both financial and
otherwise) may be very useful.
Although we are very confident in the results obtained, we recognize the
shortness of the sample and admit that the dynamics of inflation may not be
so adequately captured in such in a short period. We did not have access to
information such as maize prices or output, which are likely to have a
significant effect on inflation in Zambia. A study that includes such a variable
would be very useful in consolidating the findings in this paper. Exploring the
nature of exchange rates in Zambia would also be very useful to policy
considering its importance for inflation.
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Fig. 3.10: Price Level Correlation Function
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Appendix B Estimation Results
1999 2000 2001 2002
0.10
0.15
0.20
M2 
Rand Exchange Rate 
Deposit Rate 
Domestic Debt 
M1 
Dollar exchange Rate 
Treasury Bill Rate 
AR(1) 
1999 2000 2001 2002
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
M2 
Rand Exchange rate 
Deposit Rate 
Domestic Debt 
M1 
Dollar Exchange Rate 
Treasury Bill Rate 
AR(1) 
Fig. 3.11: 12-Month and Cumulative MAPEs
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Appendix B1 Co-Integration Results
Below we show the detailed results for the co-integration relationships
estimated in section 5.3. The graphs of the co-integrating vectors are shown
after the tabulated results.
ecm2 = (m− p)− 1.2y − 0.016itbill + 0.01idep
Tab. 3.6: Cointergrating Relationship for M2
Eigen value 0.327 0.17 0.063 0.014
λtrace 56.98 22.91 6.797 1.24
λtrace p-value 0.005 0.258 0.607 0.266
Adjustment coefficients Significance tests Weak Exogeneity tests
coefficient Standard error χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
m-p -0.1 0.04 6.98 0.008 7.813 0.005
y 0.23 0.16 9.02 0.003 2.56 0.109
itbill 7.06 2.44 10.978 0.001 13.515 0.000
idep -2.37 1.42 6.659 0.01 2.732 0.098
The co-integrating vector had 10 lags on each variable
Vector autocorrelation (1-10) F(160,10)=1.437(0.272)
Log likelihood ratio test of homogeneity restrictions :χ2(1)=0.15(0.698)
The adjustment coefficients errors reported are for the restricted model
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Tab. 3.7: Co-integrating Relationship for The Rand Exchange Rate
Eigen value 0.272 0.148 0.031
λtrace 42.77 16.089 2.61
λtrace p-values 0.05 0.494 0.905
Adjustment coefficients Significance tests Weak exogeneity tests
coefficient Standard error χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
p -0.073 0.003 4.48 0.03 10.92 0.001
e -0.196 0.01 2.81 0.09 2.539 0.111
p∗ -0.0016 0.0008 0.017 0.9 1.651 0.199
The co-integrating vector had 12 lags on each variable and a time trend
Vector autocorrelation: (1-12) F(108,227)=1.34(0.19)
Log likelihood ratio test of PPP restrictions:χ2(1)=0.15(0.698)
The adjustment coefficients errors reported are for the restricted model
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Tab. 3.8: Co-integrating Relationship for the Dollar Exchange Rate
Eigen value 0.234 0.188 0.0084
λtrace 44.489 19.988 0.775
λtrace-p-values 0.033 0.231 0.998
Adjustment coefficients Significance tests Weak exogeneity tests
coefficient Standard error χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
p -0.003 0.0006 3.78 0.05 5.24 0.022
e -0.003 0.002 0.86 0.35 0.037 0.848
p∗ -2.7651e-005 0.0002 6.73336e-005 0.99 4.4939e-005 0.995
The co-integrating vector had 12 lags on each variable and a time trend
Vector autocorrelation: (1-12) F(4,75)=0.759(0.555)
Log likelihood ratio test of PPP restrictions:χ2(1)=0.208(0.648)
The adjustment coefficients errors reported are for the restricted model
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Appendix B2 Co-integrating Relationships Graphed
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Appendix B3 OLS Inflation Equation With M1
rand dollar
coefficient t-value p-value coefficient t-value p-value
Constant 0.01 2.07 0.042 0.008 1.5 0.138
∆pt−1 0.31 3.21 0.002 0.3 3.48 0.001
∆pt−2 -0.27 -3.03 0.003
∆Mt−2 -0.06 -2.42 0.018
∆et 0.082 3.39 0.001
∆et−4 0.06 2.37 0.02
∆debtt−2 0.03 2.29 0.025
ibond 0.0006 2.26 0.026
ibondt−1 -0.0008 -3.24 0.002
ibondt−3 -0.0008 -3.18 0.002
ibondt−4 0.0007 3.25 0.002
Ecpt−1 -0.035 -2.98 0.004 -0.13 -5.71 0.000
Diagnostic tests
AR 1-4 F(4,76) 0.966(0.432) F(4,72) 0.638(0.637)
ARCH4 F(4,72) 0.231(0.92) F(4,68) 0.0769(0.989)
Normality c2(2) 6.84(0.033) c2(2) 3.732(0.1547)
Hetero F(11,68) 0.1.077(0.392) F(24,51) 0.639(0.889)
RESET F(1,79) 0.057(0.812) F(1,75) 0.314(0.577)
R2 0.53 0.64
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Appendix B4 Recursive Diagnostics
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Fig. 3.12: Recursive Diagnostics-Dollar Rate
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Fig. 3.13: Recursive Diagnostics-Rand Rate
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Appendix C: Sources Of Data Variable
Tab. 3.9: Sources Of Data
Variable Source
Output World Development indicators 2000, calculated 2001
value based on announced growth rate of 2.2% for that year
CPI Bank Of Zambia Data base and Ministry of Finance and
Economic Development Economic indicators, various years
Monetary aggregates interest rates Bank of Zambia data base and
Bank lending, asset and statutory ratios Annual Reports and Statistics fortnightly
and exchange rates
South African CPI Statistics South Africa
US CPI Federal Reserve Bank data base
Domestic Debt Economic Development Indicators, statistics fortnightly
12-month Bond Rate Bank Of Zambia Data base
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4. FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTION AND THE
EXCHANGE RATE IN ZAMBIA
ABSTRACT
The paper, investigates the effect of central bank intervention on exchange rates in
Zambia. We use a GARCH (1,1) model of the exchange rate simultaneously
estimating the effect of cumulative intervention on the mean and variance of the
exchange rate. We find that central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market
increases the mean but reduces the variance of the exchange rate. The explanation
leans towards speculative bandwagons and a ’leaning against the wind’ strategy.
Although there is no attempt to distinguish through which channel intervention
operates, we argue that this is more likely to be a signalling effect rather than a
portfolio balance effect. This effect operates mainly through the supply and demand
of foreign exchange in the market.
Keywords: Exchange rates, Central Bank, Intervention, Volatility, Sterilisation.
JEL Classifications: E52, E58, F31.
4.1 Introduction
Foreign exchange intervention occurs when the monetary authority of a
country buys or sells foreign exchange in the foreign exchange market in order
to affect the exchange rate. Since 1992 when the exchange rate was floated in
Zambia, the Bank of Zambia (BOZ) has periodically intervened in the foreign
exchange market. As part of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
conditions under the structural adjustment package, the BOZ has also
intervened in the form of foreign exchange purchases in order to accumulate
foreign reserves for the government.
The issue of whether these interventions affect the exchange rate and how this
happens has important implications for policy and has been a subject of much
debate in the literature. Distinguishing between sterilised and non-sterilised
intervention is very important. On the one hand, there is general agreement
that non-sterilised intervention can affect the exchange rate through its effect
on money supply. On the other hand, the effectiveness of sterilised
intervention is still controversial(See Danker et al. (1996), Lewis (1988b),
Humpage (1989), Baillie and Humpage (1994) and Dominguez (1998).
Our interest in the paper is to determine whether foreign exchange
intervention has an effect on exchange rates in Zambia1. As a start, we would
like to determine whether intervention in Zambia is indeed sterilised. This is of
importance because stabilisation policy in Zambia is based on the control of
money supply with M2 as an intermediate target and base money as the policy
instrument. Policy implementation is conducted by minimising deviations of
M2 from target. If intervention is not sterilised, then interventions are likely to
affect money supply growth and thus simply be part of monetary policy.
The question of the effect of interventions on the exchange rate in Zambia has
both research and policy interest. Research interest because very few such
studies if any have been done on Africa and only one such study under way is
1 The exchange rate in the study is defined as the number of kwacha (Zambian currency)
per unit of foreign exchange
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known to the author. It is of policy interest because, if sterilised intervention
has an effect on the exchange rate in Zambia, this offers the monetary
authority an additional policy tool independent from general monetary policy.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we discuss the theory on
intervention, followed by a brief discussion of the exchange rate and
intervention in Zambia in section 3. The methodology and data are discussed
in section 4 while the results are presented and discussed in section 5. We
summarise and conclude in section 6.
4.2 Theory Of Intervention
Broadly divided, the literature distinguishes between sterilised and
non-sterilised intervention. Sterilised intervention occurs when the monetary
authority offsets its foreign exchange market intervention usually with an
equal change in the net domestic credit either simultaneously or with a very
short lag. On the other hand, intervention is non-sterilised when it occurs
without any offsetting changes.
The relationship between exchange rates and monetary control stems from the
central bank’s balance sheet2. From the liabilities side, we have the base
money(Mh) made up of reserves and currency and the central bank’s net
worth. On the assets side, we have net foreign assets (NFA) and net Domestic
assets (NDA). Intervention in the foreign exchange markets will alter NFA. If
net worth is negligible, we can write a summary of the balance sheet as in
equation 4.1.
Mh = NFA+NDA (4.1)
Sterilisation requires offsetting action on the part of the central bank such as
open market operation sales or purchases of securities. This will result in an
equal change in domestic assets. Without sterilisation, the monetary base
2 The discussion here follows that of Von Hagen (1989), and the reviews in Edison (1993)
and Sarno and Taylor (2001)
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must also change i.e.
∆Mh = ∆NFA
The extent of sterilisation depends on how much simultaneous change takes
place in NDA as NFA changes. There is full sterilisation when changes in NFA
are totally offset by changes in NDA i.e.
∆NFA = ∆NDA
and
∆Mh = 0
So that there is no impact on the monetary base. Non-sterilised interventions
on the other hand will induce changes in the monetary base. These changes
will in turn translate into changes in broader money aggregates and interest
rates. This will affect expectations, capital flows and ultimately the exchange
rate. Because of this, studies of intervention have generally focused on the
effect of sterilised intervention.
4.2.1 Sterilised Intervention
A useful taxonomy of how sterilised intervention affects the exchange rate is
broadly divided into two. These are often referred to as the portfolio balance
channel and the signalling channel.
The Portfolio Balance Channel
The basic idea behind this channel is that investors balance their portfolios
between domestic and foreign assets on the basis of their expected returns and
the risk associated with those returns. The key distinguishing feature in the
model is the assumption of different risks associated with local and foreign
assets. The channel operates by changing the relative supplies of these assets
and thereby the relative riskiness. Sterilised foreign exchange interventions will
have little or no effect on interest rates since by definition it will not affect the
money supply. However, it will change the relative supplies of these assets.
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The exchange rate will then shift to affect the domestic value of foreign assets
and the expected return for holding them as investors try to re-balance their
portfolios in the asset market. It is important for the portfolio balance channel
that foreign and domestic assets have different returns and risk levels.
Without this assumption, domestic and foreign assets become perfect
substitutes and investors will be indifferent between them with no need to
re-balance their portfolios after an intervention.
Studies testing the portfolio balance channel have used two main approaches.
The first is a direct test of the model by estimating a reduced form solution of
the portfolio balance model called the demand approach. The second approach
focuses on an indirect method by solving the portfolio balance model for the
risk premium and testing for perfect substitutability of bonds denominated in
different currencies. Most traditional approaches have not provided strong
evidence for this channel despite many attempts to overcome the perceived
econometric problems encountered in estimating these models (Rogoff (1984),
Danker et al. (1996), Lewis (1988b), Gosh (1992)).
An approach pioneered by Frankel (1992), extends the traditional approach by
incorporating mean variance optimisation. This approach links expected rates
of return with bond supplies by requiring that the coefficients of an inverted
asset demand function be closely related to the variance-covariance matrix.
This approach and the extensions made to this approach failed to yield
support for the channel (Engle and Frankel (1984), Lewis (1988a), Engle and
Rodriguez (1989)). The study by Dominguez and Frankel (1993) finds that
intervention is statistically significant in a regression for the risk premium
providing strong support for the portfolio balance. This study attempted to
overcome some of the major problems encountered in previous studies. Actual
intervention data was used and survey data was used instead of invoking
expectations.
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Signaling Channel
This channel contends that even when there is perfect substitutability between
domestic and foreign assets, intervention can still affect the exchange rate
through expectations Mussa (1981). The basic idea is that agents see exchange
rate intervention as an indicator of future monetary policy. When there is
intervention, agents change their exchange rate expectations because they
expect a change in future monetary policy as a result of the intervention.
Investigation of the signalling hypothesis has taken two main strands. The
first strand studies the impact of intervention on the exchange rate
expectations in the context of portfolio balance models while the second
strand focuses on whether or not intervention actually signals monetary policy.
The early studies by Humpage (1989)and Dominguez (1990), generally find
mixed results. In their 1993 study, Dominguez and Frankel test both the
signalling and portfolio balance hypotheses. They find significance of both
channels. More recent studies include those of Kaminsky and Lewis (1996),
Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996) and Dominguez (1998). Kaminsky and Lewis
(1996) examine the signalling story by checking whether central bank
intervention signals future monetary policy. They find that indeed intervention
provides significant information about future monetary policy but the signal is
in a direction opposite to that predicted by the signalling hypothesis. The two
latter studies focus on the impact of intervention on the volatility of exchange
rates. Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996) test the hypothesis that central bank
intervention is stabilising. Generally they find that intervention affects
exchange rate volatility but in a destabilising way. Apart from one sub-period,
all the coefficients on intervention in a volatility equation were positive.
Dominguez (1998) finds similar results.
4.3 Foreign Exchange Intervention in Zambia
Prior to 1991, Zambia operated a fixed exchange rate system whose nature
changed over the years 1964 to 1991. Between 1964 and 1968, the official
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currency in Zambia was the Zambian pound which was pegged to the British
pound and fully convertible. In 1968, the currency was changed to the kwacha
and de-linked from the pound and linked to the US dollar and later to the
SDR in 1976. During this period, there was no active foreign exchange market
intervention by the central bank. The exchange rate was maintained through
administrative controls such as import licensing. Licensing was based on a
priority list of goods and services determined by the government’s development
objectives. Import quotas and high tariffs were also used. Exporters were
required to surrender their foreign exchange earnings to the central bank,
which then redistributed the foreign exchange through commercial banks.
The policy of a fixed exchange rate fell out of favour because of balance of
payments (BOP) problems in the country. As the country sought increased
BOP assistance from the international monetary Fund (IMF), there was
pressure from the fund to either devalue or float the exchange rate.
In 1983, a basket of the currencies of Zambia’s five major trading partners was
introduced. The kwacha was now adjusted within a narrow range and set to
depreciate at 1% per month and this percentage was increased to 2.5% by
1984. The foreign exchange auction was introduced in October 1985 with the
official exchange rate at 2.2 kwacha per dollar and by the beginning of 1987,
the exchange rate had increased to 15 kwacha per dollar. In 1987, as the
economy wide reforms progressed, maize subsidies were also removed.3 There
was heavy rioting on the Copperbelt, and the government decided to abandon
the IMF/World bank sponsored adjustment programmes.4 The kwacha was
revalued to 8 kwacha per dollar and the foreign exchange auction system was
replaced by allocation of foreign exchange through a foreign exchange
committee (FEMAC). The resulting decline in foreign aid put a lot of pressure
on government expenditure and in 1989 Zambia returned to the IMF and the
3 Maize is the staple food in Zambia and had thus far been heavily subsidised by the
government. When price controls were removed on other food crops such as cassava and
sorghum, maize subsidies were maintained with the view to remove these subsidies gradually
4 The Copperbelt is one of the largest and most urbanised provinces in Zambia. It holds
almost all of Zambia’s copper mines
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foreign exchange auction was re-introduced.
In 1990, a two-tier exchange rate system was introduced. The first tier was the
official tier with the exchange rate at 27.8 kwacha per dollar. The second tier
was the market tier with the exchange rate at 40 kwacha per dollar. This
latter window was used for imports under the Open General Licence (OGL)
system. In the same year, exporters of non-traditional exports were allowed
50% retention of their foreign exchange earnings and this was extended to
100% in 1992. The two tiers were unified in 1991 and private foreign exchange
rate bureaux were legalised in 1992.
Zambia entered the Rights Accumulation programme (RAP) in 1992. This
programme was meant to facilitate the clearing of arrears on debt to the IMF
and if the conditions were met, the country would be entitled to a concessional
loan with only 0.5% annual interest. The auction was phased out in 1993 and
in December of the same year, BOZ started foreign exchange dealing with
commercial banks three times a week. The Exchange Control Act was
repealed, the OGL system was abolished and the kwacha became fully
convertible. By 1995, commercial banks were allowed to maintain foreign
exchange accounts. The RAP was completed in late 1995 and there was a
surge of donor inflow in the early months of 1996. Zambia Consolidated
Copper Mines (ZCCM) was allowed 100% retention of its foreign exchange
earnings in April 1996.5
In the post-liberalisation period, short-term fluctuations in the exchange rate
have mainly been subject to three types of flows. The first has been increased
amount of BOZ intervention in the foreign exchange market to accumulate
reserves under the financial programme with the IMF6. Accumulation of these
5 ZCCM was a copper mine cooperation wholly owned by government which has since been
privatised. Before 1996, it was required to surrender its foreign exchange earnings to the
government through the central bank.
6 Financial programming is done in several steps. Once target values for the policy objec-
tives have been set, both endogenous and exogenous variables are also set, permissible money
supply growth is calculated. Total funds available for financing the domestic budget are then
estimated. It is believed that growth in domestic credit has a long run effect on foreign re-
134
reserves requires BOZ to purchase dollars off the market putting upward
pressure on the exchange rate. At the same time, the central bank also buys
and sells its own foreign exchange on the market in order to smooth the
short-term fluctuations in the exchange rate IMF (2001). If the BOZ
interventions in the exchange rate market are to achieve the desired objective
of smoothing fluctuations in market, they must be able to send a clear and
unambiguous message to market participants. This kind of multiple activities
in the market by the central bank tends to send mixed signals to the market
and thus the desired results may not be seen. Donor inflows have also
increased since the completion of the RAP in 1996 and these are also likely to
have an impact on the short-term fluctuations in the exchange rate.
Between 1993 and 1996 when ZCCM was allowed 100% retention, intervention
was mainly in the form of onward sale of foreign exchange surrendered by
exporters about three times a week. After 1994 it was mainly ZCCM receipts
that were sold to the market. We show in figure 4.1, the total and cumulative
foreign exchange rate intervention. Intervention is measured as open market
dealing in the foreign exchange market by the BOZ and is shown as sales net
of purchases of US dollars. These interventions are done for the purpose of
smoothing exchange rate movements.
We notice from the intervention graph that most intervention activity entails
net sales of dollars to the market. This suggests that the main objective of
these interventions was to appreciate the exchange rate. We also see frequent
interventions in early 1996 and the amounts are relatively high. There is also
increased intervention activity in 2001. This is a period when the exchange
rate was depreciating substantially and this increased activity may again
reflect the need to pressure the exchange rate downwards. There was a lot of
serves, establishing a given target level for growth in reserves makes it possible to estimate
the maximum allowable increase in domestic credit (Age´nor (2000)). When these goals are set
for the year, the central bank deals in the foreign exchange market to meet the given yearly
targets. Bolnick (1999) discusses the impact of some of the tight requirements under financial
programming
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Fig. 4.1: Weekly Intervention and the Exchange Rate
political pressure towards the end of 2000 and in 2001 with the run up to the
elections and the ’third term’ debate when the incumbent president wanted to
run for a third term of office. This led to much speculation and pressure from
many sectors, and this may have been the reason for the rapid depreciation
and the ensuing increased BOZ interventions.
4.4 Methodology
The general formulation of the exchange rate follows Dominguez (1998) and
models exchange rates as a forward looking process conditional on public
information. We write the spot rate as in the equation below.
st =
∞∑
k=0
∆kEt(zt+k|Ωt) (4.2)
Where St is the nominal spot exchange rate in logs, ∆ is the discount factor,
Zt a vector of exogenous variables, Ωt is the public information set at time t.
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in the case of the portfolio balance approach, foreign exchange interventions
lead people to re-balance their portfolio as a result of changes in their relative
portfolio compositions so that the effect of intervention can enter as an
exogenous variable in the vector Z. Under signalling on the other hand,
intervention provides additional information to the market so that Ω < Ω+ It
where It is foreign exchange intervention. This new information will change
market agents’ expectations translating ultimately into changes in the spot
rate St.
Inherent in the equation above is the assumption that exchange rates are
efficient aggregators of information and market expectations are rational so
that any hypothesis test based on this equation involves a joint hypothesis
that the foreign exchange market is economically efficient (Dominguez (1998)).
Implicit also in the signalling interpretation above is the hypothesis that
intervention signals are credible and unambiguous. In both cases, reality may
be otherwise. In Zambia actions of the monetary policy authority may be
conflicting. For example, it is not clear to a market agent when the BOZ buys
foreign exchange whether this is signalling future monetary policy or foreign
reserves accumulation. In this case a market purchase of the dollar is an
ambiguous signal.
Empirical work on the effect of exchange rates has used a number of different
approaches. A number of early studies regressed the spot exchange rate on
intervention variables. Later different methods were used to test the
desirability of intervention by checking whether intervention was profitable.
More recently, different approaches have been used to test the impact of
exchange rates on the volatility of exchange rates. In the estimations, we use
the contemporaneous value and one lag of the intervention variable.
We investigate the impact of intervention on both the level and volatility of
exchange rates without specific reference to the channel through which this
effect may operate. Discriminating between the portfolio balance and
signalling channels requires clear maintained hypotheses about conditions on
the associated risk factors and their interaction with intervention. Generally,
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because of the small size of intervention versus market volumes of currency,
intervention effects are often seen as being signalling effects. This is likely to
be the more plausible interpretation of our results. Zambian financial asset
markets are underdeveloped and investment is often associated with political
risk. With this is in mind, exchange rate movements are more likely to be
important for local exporters and importers of goods and services. In this
case, volatility in exchange rates is likely to result from speculative band
wagons and changes in expectations about future market fundamentals.
4.4.1 Data
We use two sets of data in the study. The first set of data is a monthly series
and includes base money, the retail mid exchange rate, intervention, aid and
the consumer price index.7 This data set is used to investigate whether
intervention in Zambia is sterilised. It was not possible to get price and base
money data at the weekly frequency. The second data set consists of
intervention, aid flows and exchange rates at a weekly frequency. This data set
is used to investigate the effect of central bank intervention on the level and
variance of the exchange rate. All data are from the Bank of Zambia annual
reports and statistics fortnightly.
Intervention and Donor Aid
Intervention is measured as open market dealing in the foreign exchange
market by the BOZ. These interventions are done for the purpose of
smoothing exchange rate movements. Official statistics distinguish between
such foreign exchange intervention and interventions meant for other purposes
such as accumulation of reserves and debt servicing. It is known that central
banks are reluctant to release high frequency intervention data and when
released is usually with a lag (Gosh 2002, Dominguez (1998). With this high
level of secrecy in intervention operations, it is probable that the statistics
7 The mid rate is defined at the mean between the retail buying and selling rates.
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may not accurately distinguish between the various types of interventions in
which the central bank is involved. Unfortunately, we are unable to get a
similar frequency of data for the other interventions covering the whole sample
period to enable us to test if including all the variables in the intervention
measure makes a difference to the results obtained in this study. We are also
unable to distinguish between announced and secret interventions due to the
lack of consistent announced data.
Aid is measured as donor inflows as shown in BOZ official statistics. The
original intervention and aid data are shown in millions of dollars. We use the
central bank mid rate to convert these into kwacha values. Cumulative series
for these variables are used in preference to actual intervention and aid series
because it allows us to capture cumulated effects of these variables over time.
This approach has been used in other studies.8
Base Money and Output
Base money is measured as the sum of kwacha currency in circulation plus
commercial bank reserves at the central bank. The output series is
interpolated from an annual series using the Denton method.9. The series is
filtered using Hodrick-Prescott method to extract the output growth
component and this is used in the estimation.
Below, we describe the characteristics of the data used in the analysis. We
start by looking at the monthly data set and then proceed to look at the
weekly one.
Table 4.1 shows summary statistics of the series and figure two their graphs.
The series includes the base money, cumulative intervention, output and
cumulative aid. All variables are expressed in natural logs. From a casual
8 See Dominguez and Frankel (1993) and Sweeney (2003)
9 The Denton Method for interpolating data uses an ’associated series’ imposing the con-
straint that the interpolated series must obey the annual totals. The indicator series con-
tributes its pattern to the series and adds more information especially where such movements
in such a series are closely related to the series to be interpolated. See Renka (1988) and
Baum (2001)
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Tab. 4.1: Descriptive Statistics Monthly Series
UnitRoota Normality Mean Std Dev. Min max
Variable level 1st diff
Base money -2.15 -11.04** 4.29 12.63 0.46 11.92 13.59
CI -1.68 -8.16** 5.32 12.49 0.74 11.19 13.63
CAID 3.05 -9.16 4.25 13.57 0.91 11.73 14.93
S -3.04 -6.2** 4.18 7.73 0.39 7.15 8.34
Y -3.54** 1.23 5.77 0.24 5.26 6.28
a These are Phillips- Perron tests. All the log level tests were conducted with a
constant and a trend in them. These proved to be more appropriate after preliminary
examination.
Correlation matrix
Variable Base money CI CAID CPI
Base money 1.00 0.94126 0.85385
CI 0.94126 1.00 0.86053
CAID 0.85385 0.86053 1.00
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inspection, three of the series exhibit some non-stationarity. Unit root test
were run using the Phillips-Perron method.10
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Fig. 4.2: Monthly Series in Logs
The statistics suggest that all the variables are integrated of order one and all
are stationary in first differences. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the same series in
logs and first differences respectively. From figure 4.3, we identify some
outliers especially in the cumulative aid and intervention series. For the aid
series, this occurs in early 1996 when Zambia had just completed the Rights
Accumulation Programme (RAP) under the IMF restructuring programme
and was therefore receiving large amounts of aid. We also observe unusually
high values for growth in cumulative intervention reflecting periods of high
levels of intervention in the foreign exchange market. This is observed in July
10 This is a method developed by Phillips and Perron (1988) and is a generalisation of
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The assumptions about error properties are less
stringent than in the ADF method. The unit root tests the hypothesis that ρ = 1 in the
equation ∆y = µ+ρyt−1+ε.The cumulative aid series shows a huge jump in the early part of
the series as explained below.we therefore conduct the unit root tests from September 1996.
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and August 1996 and November 1997 to January 1998.
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Fig. 4.3: Growth in the Monthly Series
In the table 4.2 we show the summary statistics for the two weekly data series.
Unit roots are also tested using the Philips-Perron method. both series are
integrated of order 1 and stationary in first differences. Both series exhibit
clustering as evidenced in the kurtosis.
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Tab. 4.2: Descriptive Statistics Weekly Series
Unit Roota Normality Mean Variance Skewnessb Kurtosisb
levels 1st diff
CINT -1.1 16.25** 11.47** 4.8 0.57 -0.45 2.88
S -2.6 -10.96** 28.21** 7.77 0.44 -0.14 1.62
a Normality is tested using the Jarque-Bera test statistic which is χ2 distributed with 2
degrees of freedom.
b Skewness and kurtosis are standardised to a normal distribution so that skewness should
be equal to zero and kurtosis equal to 3.
Correlation matrix
S CINT
S 1.000 0.883(0.0756)
CINT c 0.883(0.0756) 1.000
c The value in the brackets shows correlation between cumulative intervention and
depreciation
**(*) denotes significance at the 1%(5 %) level
4.5 Estimation and Results
In this section, we estimate our model in equations 4.3 to 4.6 and discuss the
results. We start by conducting a simple test to determine whether
intervention in Zambia is sterilised or not. After that we estimate an OLS
equation of the growth rate of the exchange rate and thereafter a GARCH
(1,1) model due to the presence of ARCH effects in the data.
4.5.1 Is Intervention Sterilised?
In this section, we check whether foreign exchange intervention in Zambia is
sterilised. Following the outline in section 2, it follows that to determine
whether foreign exchange intervention is indeed sterilised, we must check if it
has an effect on the growth of base money. In the estimation, we treat the
outliers identified in the data in two ways. In the first case, we create dummies
for outliers in both the cumulative intervention and aid series. For the aid
variable, we call this dummy ’dumaid’ which takes the value of one for the first
six months of 1996 and zero for the rest of the estimation period. We also have
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a dummy for periods of large interventions and call this dummy ’dumcint’.
This dummy has value one for July and August 1996 and November 1997 to
January 1998 and zero for the rest of the estimation period. We then regressed
the growth of the base rate on cumulative aid, monthly inflation, cumulative
intervention and the two dummies. In the second case, we leave out of the
sample the first six months of the earlier sample and begin the estimation in
July 1996 but include the intervention dummy.
Equation 4.3 is estimated by ordinary least squares. The equation is a
standard way of checking for sterilisation with a measure for the income gap
(Kearney and Macdonald (1985), Von Hagen (1989) and Sarno and Taylor
(2001)). Most of the early studies that investigated issues of sterilisation used
net foreign assets as a measure of intervention in the absence of actual
intervention data. We have the advantage of having actual intervention data
and we use this variable instead.
∆m = β0+β1∆cint+β2∆caid+β3∆Y trend+β4dumcint+β5dumaid+ε (4.3)
The variables cint and caid are the cumulative intervention and aid variables
in logs. Ytrend is output growth trend and ε is the error term. Preliminary
estimations showed significant first order autocorrelation in the residuals. We
then included one lag of the dependent variable as one of the explanatory
variables. The results from both equations are very similar and we show the
results for the model with the two dummies in table 4.3. The diagnostics of
the models show that the equation is well specified. We find that neither the
intervention nor the aid variables are significant. The proxy for the income
gap, Y trend is marginally significant at 7%. Since the intervention variable is
not significant, we conclude that there is full sterilisation of foreign exchange
intervention in Zambia.
In our analysis, we have concentrated on the short run effects of intervention
on the monetary base. Some observers have argued that although full
sterilisation can be achieved in the short run, there may not be full
sterilisation in the long run. Inability to achieve full long run sterilisation may
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Tab. 4.3: OLS Regression of Base Money
variable coefficient Std error t-value t-prob
C -3.04 -1.655 -1.84 0.07*
∆mt−1 -0.43 0.12 -5.55 0.000***
∆cint 0.09 0.09 0.95 0.345
∆caid 0.02 0.08 0.244 0.81
Ytrend 0.054 0.0.28 1.88 0.066*
dumcint -0.031 0.035 -0.896 0.374
R2 0.52
F(12,45) 3.994 0.000**
AR(1) F(5,40)a 1.98 0.103
ARCH F(5,35)b 0.764 0.582
Normalityc 0.734 0.693
Hetero test F(16,28)d 0.76 0.712
Reset F(1,44)e 0.128 0.723
Instability 2.63
(***)**(*) denotes significance at the (one) five, and (ten) percent level
a The AR(1-5) test is an LM test for 5th order residual autocorrelation calculated
according to Harvey (1981)
b ARCH tests the presence of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity Engel (1982)
c Normality test based on Doornik and Hansen (1994)with a small sample correction
d Based on White (1980), the test checks for unconditional heteroskedasticity
e The RESET test due to Ramsey (1969), tests the null of correct model specification
f The instability test is a joint parameter test for instability based on Hansen (1992).
reflect institutional deficiencies or in the case of monetary targeting monetary
policy, the authority’s willingness to give in on its monetary target to lend
more weight to exchange rate considerations. In a study of sterilisation in
Germany, Von Hagen (1989) finds that the Bundesbank sterilises in the short
run but not in the long run. Indeed being a monetary targeting bank as well,
it may well be that BOZ is not able to fully sterilise its interventions in the
long run. This is even more likely in the case for Zambia since political
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interference in preference for stable exchange rates over achieving monetary
goals is sometimes very significant. The focus on short-term sterilisation in the
paper is sufficient for analysing the effect of intervention on the short-term
fluctuations in the exchange rate.
4.5.2 Does Intervention Affect the Exchange Rates?
In this section, we address the question of whether central bank intervention in
foreign exchange rate markets in Zambia affects the exchange rate. Three
outliers were identified in the exchange rate series. They fall in the fourth
week of March 1999, the second week of March and the third week of May
2001 and last week of may 2002. We introduce a dummy variable dumrate,
which takes the value of 1 for each of these points and zero for the rest of the
estimation period. As an alternate formulation, we introduce single dummies
for each of these points i.e. dum99, dum20011, dum20012 and dum2002.
We start by running a preliminary OLS equation of the depreciation of the
exchange rate on a constant, the growth in cumulative intervention and
dumrate and as an alternative with the single dummies. The results are
presented in table 4.4.
In both cases, the intervention variable is not significant. All the dummy
variables in either formulation are highly significant. These preliminary results
suggest that central bank intervention may not have an effect on the
depreciation rate. Intervention however may affect the exchange rate by
affecting its volatility rather than just the level of depreciation. From the
ARCH tests, we cannot reject that there are ARCH effects in both equations.
We then proceed to estimate a GARCH(1,1) model and simultaneously
estimate the effect of intervention on both the mean and volatility of the
exchange rate.
Exchange rate volatility has been modelled mainly through implied volatility
measured by option prices (Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996) Bonser-Neal
(1996)) and GARCH methods (Dominguez (1992), Baillie and
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Tab. 4.4: OLS Regression of the Exchange Rate
Single Dummy Multiple Dummies
coeff. t-value prob coeff. t-value t-prob.
C 0.005 -8.83 0.00 0.005 -8.98 0.00
∆cintt−1 -0.011 -0.756 0.449 0.-01 -0.63 0.528
Dumrate -0.103 -19.51 0.00
Dum99 -0.11 -10.33 0.00
Dum20011 -0.13 -12.55 0.00
Dum20012 -0.011 -10.24 0.00
Dum2002 -0.07 -6.90 0.00
ARCH(1)a 16.82 0.000** 9.17 0.0.003**
ARCH(1-3) 7.57 0.000** 6.09 0.00**
ARCH(1-5) 5.36 0.000** 4.17 0.001**
**(*) denotes significance at the 1%(5%) level
aARCH tests the presence of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity Engel (1982).
Humpage(1994), Dominguez (1998)).11 In the study, we use the later approach
to model the heteroscedastic errors in our exchange rate equation. Apart from
the fact that data allows this approach, it is advantageous because it allows us
to simultaneously test the effect of intervention on both the mean and
conditional volatility of exchange rates.
Figure 1 suggests that we may have some asymmetry in the intervention series
and to some extent in the depreciation series (see figure 4). To take account of
this behaviour, we use the exponential GARCH (EGARCH) approach to
account for asymmetric effects. Such an approach is important where say
downward movements in the market are followed by higher volatilities than
upward movements of the same magnitude as seems to be evident in our data.
11 Implied volatility can be defined as the volatility that equates the theoretical and observed
market prices of a foreign exchange option. It reflects the average expected volatility over the
life of the option
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Diagnostics however show that a simple GARCH(1,1) model is superior to the
EGARCH. Our model is shown in equations 4.4 to 4.6 below.
∆lnSt = α+∆lnCINTt−1 + λg(ht) + γdumrate+ εt (4.4)
εt | Ωt D(0, ht) (4.5)
ht = ω + αε2t−1 + βht−1 + ϕlnCINTt−1 (4.6)
The first equation is the conditional mean equation and tests the effect of
intervention on the depreciation of the exchange rate. We also introduce the
variance in this equation as a regressor through g, a suitable function entering
the equation as either the variance itself or its square root. This is called the
ARCH-M Model (Engle et al. (1987)). It is used to asses whether the mean
explicitly depends on the variance.
The second equation shows the distribution of the error term, which is
conditional on the information, set Ω period t− 1. The conditional density D
follows a generalised error distribution. The third equation is the conditional
variance equation. It is a function of three variables, the mean ω, news about
volatility from the previous period, ε2t−1 and last period forecast variance ht−1.
For the model to be well defined and the variance to be positive, the following
conditions must hold i.e ω > 0, α > 0 and β ≥ 0. Our specification above also
includes the intervention variable in the variance equation. This allows us to
see the effect of intervention on the exchange rate volatility.
Our model is estimated by quasi-maximum likelihood method. In this method,
the likelihood function provides consistent estimates of the parameters even if
the assumption of normality is violated (Bollerslev and Wooldgrige (1992) and
Runkle(1989)). This offers a good option because our preliminary OLS
estimations revealed non-normality in the data. The standard errors are
adjusted by the Bollerslev and Wooldridge method. The results are shown in
table 4.5.
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Tab. 4.5: GARCH Estimation of the Exchange Rate
Multiple Dummies Single Dummy No Dummies
Coeff. t-stat. Prob. Coeff. t-stat. Prob. Coeff. t-stat. Prob.
Conditional mean
C 0.001 -1.58 0.115 -0.001 -1.312 0.19 0.103 0.886 0.376
garchsqr 0.467 4.77 0.00 0.414 4.319 0.00 0.00 0.358 0.721
∆cintt 0.011 1.50 0.13 0.012 1.349 0.178 0.001 1.31 0.896
∆cintt−1 0.02 1.98 0.05* 0.026 1.766 0.078* 0.014 1.577 0.116
Dumrate -0.09 -5.863 0.00***
Dum99 -0.078 -2.62 0.00
Dum20011 - 0.245 -3.89 0.00***
Dum20012 -0.125 -14.31 0.000***
Dum2002 -0.86 -4.29 0.000***
Conditional variance
C 2.09E05 2.5 0.01 1.73E06 2.293 0.023 1.70E06 1.513 0.13
α 0.423 3.4 0.001*** 0.439 4.979 0.00 0.926 5.523 0.00
β 0.65 11.63 0.000*** 0.66 14.643 0.00*** 0.538 10.94 0.000
∆cintt−1 -4.2E05 -1.99 0.047 -4.59E05 -1.784 0.075* -2.21E05 -1.406 0.161
Diagnostics
Q(5)a 1.05 0.958 1.623 0.961 0.788 0.978
ARCH(1)b 0.144 0.704 0.671 0.79 0.017 0.898
ARCH (1-3) 0.289 0.831 0.325 0.808 0.616 0.997
ARCH(1-5) 0.21 0.959 0.196 0.964 0.057 0.998
Waldd 0.681 0.41 2.22 0.137 88.97 0.00
***(**)(*) denotes significance at the one (five)(ten) percent level
aMeasures autocorrelation in the squared residuals with 5 lags.
cTests the presence of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity Engel (1982)
Exclusion tests for the dummy variables:dumrate, F=380(0.00) and multiple dummies, F=103.03(0.00)
dTests the persistence of volatility shocks
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We find that the results from the two models with the dummy variables are
very similar while those of the model with no dummies vary in some cases.
The first lag of the intervention variable is significant in both the mean and
variance equations in the two models with dummies and insignificant in the
model without dummies. Given that the exclusion of the dummy variables is
significantly rejected, the discussion will focus on the two models that include
dummies. At the bottom of table 4.5, we show some diagnostic tests. The Q
statistics for the square residuals show no autocorrelation in all the
specifications. The ARCH tests indicate no ARCH errors in all the equations.
The first result we find is that the intervention variable is positive in the mean
equation suggesting that net sales of dollars lead to a depreciation of the
kwacha. Similar result have been observed in other studies such as Dominguez
and Frankel (1993), Almekinders and Eijfinger (1995), Baillie and Osterberg
(1997), Dominguez (1998) and Beine et al. (2002) on US data and Aguilar and
Nydal (2000) for Sweden. On average BOZ foreign exchange market
intervention are net sales of the dollar. Because the country has low levels of
foreign reserves, this result suggests that this may not be what the central
bank would like to see. The common interpretation in the literature for this
result is that of leaning against the wind. This means that the central bank
attempts to oppose a depreciation of its currency (Baillie and Osterberg
(1997)) or simply tries to resist short run trends in the exchange rate. The
coefficients are only significant at the 5 and 8 % levels with an impact of about
2-3 % on weekly depreciation.
The more plausible explanation for Zambia is that this may reflect speculation
in the foreign exchange market (Beine et al. (2002)) or speculative
”bandwagons” (Bonser-Neal (1996)). It is not uncommon in Zambia for the
dollar to be scarce on the market even after a central bank sale. The tendency
is to purchase as many dollars as possible after a central bank sale and then
withhold the dollars until the exchange rate rises again and resell. This kind of
speculation may stem from the fact that since the reforms, the nominal
exchange rate has been depreciating almost continuously. It may also be
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exacerbated if the market participants believe that the central bank’s resolve
to stabilise the exchange rate is strong. In such a case speculators will buy the
dollar until it appreciates again and they will resell. This argument is similar
to that offered by Beine et al. (2002) who argue that the positive sign may
reflect the market’s attack on the currency after an initial successful
intervention in order to test the determination of the central bank to defend
the currency, which may ultimately result in a depreciation.
As a second result, we find that central bank intervention reduces the variance
of the exchange rate. This shows that the central bank actually achieves its
objective of smoothing out exchange rate fluctuations. This result is similar to
findings in other studies for volatility.12 However, the change in cumulative
intervention has a less than 1 % effect on weekly exchange rate volatility. The
data discussed in section 4 suggests increased intervention from periods when
the exchange rate began to rise quite rapidly. This supports our leaning
against the wind strategy proposed above which is in line with BOZ’s main
objective for foreign exchange intervention.
A reconciliation between the opposite effects of intervention on the mean and
volatility of the exchange rate can be found in the interaction between
speculative band wagons and nature of shocks to the foreign exchange
markets. When the variability in exchange rates is caused at least in part
endogenously, intervention can lower volatility by providing information to
traders in the foreign exchange market. According to the signalling hypothesis
this causes market participants to revise their expectations given the new
information conveyed by central bank intervention. Based on demand and
supply of foreign exchange in the market, the central bank is able to
manipulate the exchange rate at least at the time that intervention takes place
(Hung (1997) and Westerhoff (2001)). When BOZ sells dollars on the market,
they succeed in reducing volatility but because of speculation, the exchange
rate rises as explained above but with reduced variability.
12 See for example studies by Ramchander and Sant (2002), Hung (1997) and Rogers and
Siklos (2003)
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The third result is that both the ARCH and GARCH parameters are
significant in the variance equation for all specifications. The β coefficient is
just over 0.6 and is highly significance in all cases indicating the persistence of
volatility. We find an α coefficient of 0.4 which is also very significant
indicating a strong reaction of the conditional variance to shocks. The wald
test(shown at the bottom of table 4.5) shows that the sum of the two
coefficients is not significantly different from 1, indicating an IGARCH process
with persistent volatility.
4.6 Summary and Conclusion
In the paper, we investigate the impact of central bank intervention on the
exchange rate in Zambia. We begin by running a standard regression on base
money to see if intervention in Zambia is sterilized. The results indicate that
indeed there is sterilization as the intervention variable is not significant. Since
aid forms significant foreign exchange flows, we also include this variable in the
estimation and find that this variable also has no effect on base money.
We then estimate an exchange rate equation using weekly data and cumulative
intervention as a regressor. Preliminary OLS regressions show the presence of
ARCH effects and non-normality so we proceed to estimate GARCH (1,1)
model by quasi-maximum likelihood. We find that cumulative intervention
tends to lead to a depreciation but reduces exchange rate volatility. Our
explanation of the observed results tends towards ’leaning against the wind’
which is in line with BOZ exchange rate objective of smoothing exchange rate
fluctuations.
The fact that intervention has a desired effect on the exchange rate at least in
part, shows that BOZ interventions in the foreign exchange markets are
successful. The question of how to reduce the positive impact on the
depreciation rate is important. One issue that could be addressed is that of
foreign exchange rate speculation which seems to be rampant in the country.
On the research front, the study does not address the issue of long-term
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impact of intervention. This is an important issue because of the importance
of money supply in stabilization policy in Zambia. Further work could be done
to investigate whether intervention is sterilized in the long run and if so
whether the effects of intervention on the exchange rate are a short or long run
phenomenon. Although markets are still quite underdeveloped in Zambia, the
stock market has been operating for almost ten years now and the capital
account has been open for almost just as long. This suggests that there may
be room for intervention to affect the exchange rate through financial assets as
suggested by the portfolio balance model. Testing the hypothesis of portfolio
effects is another question of future research interest, which may also offer very
useful options for policy makers.
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